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This overview describes recent incursion~ of exotic animal diseases. 
Important lessons can be learned from these examples. U.S. agricul-
ture is very vulnerable to the introduction of a foreign animal disease. 
Outbreaks can occur when a pathogen is inadvertently introduced in 
contaminated material carried by an international traveler, or in imported 
animals or animal products. Foreign animal diseases could enter the U.S. 
vectored by wild animals, insects, or migratory birds or they could be 
intentionally introduced to cause severe economic problems or to target 
human health. Descriptions of recent outbreaks of foreign animal disease 
in various countries and the impact they had are presented here to raise 
understanding of the importance of these diseases and their detection, 
prevention, and control. 
Private practitioners are the nation's first line of defense for identifying 
foreign animal disease outbreaks and emerging diseases. Human and ani-
mal health and the economic welfare of producers, practitioners, the feed 
industry, pharmaceutical and biologics industries, packers, and, ultimately, 
consumers depend on veterinarians. 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Hong Kong, 1997-2002, 
and Southeast Asia, 2003-2005 
Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza occur periodically 
throughout the world when viruses carried in wild birds emerge into poul-
try. A swift response to an outbreak can eliminate the virus from poultry 
flocks and return trade relations to normal. Rapid eradication can also 
protect humans from zoonotic infections and reduce the possibility that an 
avian virus could become adapted to humans. Many new isolates ofthe 
influenza viruses seem to come from southern China, where farmers often 
mix different species of terrestrial poultry, waterfowl, and pigs - a situa-
tion that allows influenza viruses from different species to acquire gene 
segments from each other. Hong Kong, which maintains a comprehen-
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sive surveillance program and has a high awareness of avian influenza, 
is considered to be a sentinef for new viral reassortants. From 1997 to 
2002, Hong Kong experienced repeated outbreaks with various H5N1 
influenza viruses. These outbreaks raised the suspicion that new virulent 
reassortants ofH5N1 were becoming established in the region. After an 
epidemic in 1997, during which the first serious zoonotic infections were 
reported, Hong Kong was diligent in maintaining surveillance for new 
viruses and rapidly stamping out each outbreak. The poultry population 
of Hong Kong was partially or completely depopulated three times in five 
years. In contrast, an avian influenza H5N1 virus that appeared in several 
Asian countries in 2003 was not immediately stamped out everywhere. 
As a result, this virus seems to have become endemic in Asian birds, has 
spread to birds in Europe, and has triggered fears of a human pandemic. 
Avian influenza, a disease seen mainly in poultry, is caused by viruses 
in the genus influenzavirus A, family Orthomyxoviridae. The avian 
influenza viruses are usually spread by the fecal-oral route; they can be 
transmitted directly, or indirectly on fomites and mechanical vectors such 
as flies. They may also be transmitted in respiratory secretions when 
birds are in close contact. In addition, these viruses are found inside eggs; 
although these eggs are unlikely to hatch, they may spread the virus if 
they break. There are two forms of avian influenza in domestic poultry. 
The more common form, called low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI), 
is usually a subclinical or mild infection. Typically, an infected flock has 
subtle signs such as decreased egg production or a somewhat increased 
mortality rate; serious symptoms occur only if there are concurrent dis-
eases or stressors. In contrast, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 
or 'fowl plague" is a severe disease with morbidity and mortality rates as 
high as 90-100%. HPAI can affect domestic poultry, game birds, and rat-
ites; however, a HPAI virus does not necessarily affect all species equally. 
For instance, a virus might cause severe disease in chickens and turkeys, 
but minimal symptoms in ducks and quail. Typical HPAI symptoms 
include depression, inappetence, and respiratory signs such as coughing, 
nasal and ocular discharge, a swollen face, and cyanosis of the comb and 
wattles. The birds may also have diarrhea or neurologic signs such as 
paralysis. In some cases, sudden death can occur with few clinical signs. 
Any surviving birds are usually in poor condition. 
The avian influenza viruses, which are highly variable, can be clas-
sified into subtypes based on two proteins, the hemagglutinin ('H') and 
neuraminidase ('N'). There are at least 16 different hemagglutinin anti-
gens (Hl to H16) and 9 neuraminidase antigens (N1 to N9). Influenza 
viruses can change very quickly. Due to their poor proofreading during 
gene replication, they have a very high mutation rate. They also have a 
segmented genome, which facilitates reassortment. Reassortment can 
take place whenever two different influenza viruses infect the same cell; 
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when the new viruses (the 'progeny') are assembled, they may contain 
some genes from one parent virus and some genes from the other. Because 
the influenza viruses are so variable, viruses that share a subtype are not 
necessarily closely related and may differ greatly in their virulence, host 
specificity, or other factors. An avian influenza virus is classified as a LPAI 
or HPAI virus based on its genetic features and its virulence in poultry. 
HPAI viruses, which have been eradicated from poultry flocks in most 
developed nations, are usually H5 or H7 viruses. However, not all H5 and 
H7 viruses are highly virulent; many H5 and H7 LPAI viruses also exist. 
These LPAI viruses are also of concern, because some of them mutate and 
become highly pathogenic after circulating in poultry flocks for a time. 
Where Do Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses Come From? 
Although avian influenza is a disease seen mainly in domestic poultry, 
avian influenza viruses are carried asymptomatically by a wide variety of 
birds. Waterfowl, which carry all of the subtypes, are considered to be the 
reservoir hosts. These birds shed viruses in the feces, sometimes resulting 
in the emergence of a virus into domestic poultry (or, rarely, mammals). 
Thus, outbreaks ofHPAI can occur even in countries that have eradicated 
these viruses from their commercial poultry flocks. Many new isolates 
come from southern China, an area some scientists call an "epicenter" for 
the avian influenza viruses. Farmers there often raise different types of 
poultry, including domestic waterfowl, alongside each other on high-den-
sity small farms - creating a perfect breeding ground for new influenza 
strains. These poultry are often reared under low biosecurity conditions, 
and may be exposed to wild birds or water where these birds have been 
swimming. In addition, poultry may be raised in close contact with both 
pigs and people, increasing the likelihood of virus recombination and 
virus transmission between birds and mammals as well. 
The island territory of Hong Kong, which imports large quantities of 
poultry from China, is considered to be a sentinel for these new viruses. 
China supplies over 70% of the 100,000 fresh chickens eaten in Hong Kong 
every day and is the territory's leading source for geese, ducks, quail, and 
pheasants. Unlike Mainland China, Hong Kong also has a comprehensive 
influenza surveillance system that allows it to quickly detect new viruses, 
and an established response system that allows it to respond effectively and 
rapidly to disease outbreaks. From 1997 to 2002, Hong Kong experienced 
several disquieting outbreaks with new strains ofH5Nl viruses. 
Avian Influenza in Hong Kong, 1997- A Deadly Strain in Humans 
The first disturbing outbreak occurred in Hong Kong poultry flocks in 
1997. Before this epidemic, which began in late March, the avian influ-
enza viruses were not thought to cause serious disease in humans. Then, in 
May, a H5Nl avian influenza virus was isolated from a fatal case of acute 
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pneumonia and respiratory distress syndrome in an otherwise healthy 
3-year old boy. This virus, which seemed to be transmitted by contact 
with sick birds, eventually killed five more Hong Kong residents and 
caused serious illness in 12 others. The discovery that the H5Nl/97 virus 
was pathogenic for humans added urgency to the eradication efforts. 
Approximately 1.5 million chickens in live bird markets and farms were 
eventually slaughtered in a successful bid to stop the epidemic. Some 
people think this rapid response may have averted an incipient human 
influenza pandemic. Since 1997, sporadic human infections have been 
reported with other avian influenza viruses, including other isolates 
ofH5Nl as well as H7N2, H7N3, H7N7, and H9N2 viruses. To date, 
human infections with the highly pathogenic viruses, particularly H5Nl, 
seem to be more severe. Most zoonotic infections with the non-H5N1 
viruses have been limited to conjunctivitis or relatively mild respiratory 
infections, but severe, fatal, infections have also been seen. Human cases 
generally seem to result from direct contact with infected poultry or 
fomites, although rare instances of limited person-to-person transmission 
have also been documented. 
The H5N1/97 virus may hold clues to help researchers determine 
which avian influenza viruses will infect humans. When this virus was 
analyzed, it was found to be a reassortant that contained genes from sev-
eral different species of birds. One of the 'parent' viruses was a H5N1 
virus similar to one first isolated from geese in China's Guangdong 
province in 1996. Such viruses are known as the Goose/Guangdong/1/96 
(H5N1 Gs/Gd)-like viruses. Another segment was contributed by influen-
za viruses found mainly in quail. The reassortment between these viruses 
was probably facilitated by the mixing of bird species in Hong Kong's 
many retail live bird markets. These markets, where poultry is bought 
live, and killed and plucked in front of the customer, are very popular 
among Hong Kong consumers. In 1997, the live bird markets contained 
waterfowl such as ducks and geese, and terrestrial birds such as chickens, 
quail, and guinea fowl. In addition to allowing new reassortant viruses 
to arise, these markets facilitate their spread; birds not sold at the market 
and returned to the farm may carry new infections with them. 
To prevent the reemergence of another H5Nl/97-like virus, Hong 
Kong established a central slaughterhouse for ducks and geese in 1998. 
This measure was intended to keep the influenza viruses found in these 
aquatic poultry separate from other parent viruses found mainly in quail. 
Government representatives also called for a central slaughterhouse 
for chickens in Hong Kong, but the industry feared that this would 
undermine the livelihood of its 20,000 chicken sellers. Terrestrial poul-
try- chickens, quail, pigeons, pheasants, and guinea fowl- continued to 
be sold and slaughtered in the retail live bird markets. After 1997, Hong 
Kong also established an elaborate system ofblood tests, inspections, 
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and quarantine rules to screen imported birds, as well as a surveillance 
system to test birds at the central slaughterhouse and in the live bird mar-
kets. However, Hong Kong can only control avian influenza viruses in its 
own domestic poultry. Hong Kong officials have no authority to monitor 
or regulate health and environmental conditions on Mainland China farms, 
nor are they able to control the avian influenza viruses in the millions of 
migratory wild birds in the area. Although the H5Nl/97 virus was suc-
cessfully eradicated from poultry, individual viruses containing its gene 
segments continued to circulate in birds in the region. 
Avian Influenza in Hong Kong, 2001 
For a time, Hong Kong's separation of terrestrial and aquatic poultry 
seemed to work. From 1999 to 2001 , H5N1 viruses were intermittently 
isolated from geese and ducks at the central slaughterhouse, but no H5N1 
viruses were found during routine surveillance in the live terrestrial 
poultry markets. Then, in April 2001, H5N1 viruses were found in three 
of eight retail markets; these viruses were isolated in fecal swabs from 
several apparently healthy chickens, silky chickens, pigeons, quail, and 
pheasants. This finding led to more intense scrutiny of the markets, and 
additional H5N1 isolates were found in cloacal swabs from dead chickens 
in 30 live bird markets. There were no symptoms ofHPAI until mid-May, 
when three markets reported that the mortality rates in their poultry had 
increased greatly. On May 17, 2001, the Government of Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of China (SAR) reported an outbreak of 
highly pathogenic avian influenza type A (H5Nl) virus to the OlE. The 
three affected live-bird markets were closed and all birds were destroyed. 
The following day all wholesale and retail markets selling chickens in 
Hong Kong were closed and the birds were culled. Beginning May 21 
Hong Kong authorities depopulated approximately 1.2 million live birds 
as a precautionary measure. The cull covered 208 farms raising chickens, 
pigeons, and quail. Importation of live birds from Mainland China was 
stopped and retail markets for live poultry remained closed for four weeks. 
This outbreak is estimated to have cost $3.86 million including compensa-
tion to poultry vendors. 
Although the cost of eradication was high, the surveillance system and 
quick response allowed Hong Kong to eliminate the H5Nl/2001 viruses 
before illness became widespread in poultry. These viruses were found 
to be reassortants that contained gene segments from various influenza 
viruses of waterfowl. One of the parental viruses was, once again, a H5Nl 
Gs/Gd-like virus. This time, waterfowl viruses had been able to infect 
terrestrial poultry by reasserting with other waterfowl viruses. At least 
five different H5Nl genotypes were isolated during the 2001 outbreak. 
Although all five were highly pathogenic for chickens after experimen-
tal infection, only one was associated with the increased mortality rates 
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in the three markets. This genotype had a mutation in the neuramini-
dase gene that increased its ability to spread in terrestrial poultry. The 
genetic analysis also suggested that the quick response to the outbreak 
might have prevented human disease. None of the H5Nl/2001 viruses 
had the same genotype as the H5Nl/97 virus and no human cases were 
reported in 2001. However, some of the viruses that had contributed 
gene segments to the H5Nl/97 virus were still circulating in quail in the 
live bird markets. Given time, these viruses might have reassorted with 
the H5Nl/2001 virus and produced another genotype that could infect 
humans. After the 2001 outbreak, Hong Kong authorities prohibited sell-
ing live quail where other poultry were sold in live bird markets. 
The exclusion of waterfowl from Hong Kong's retail live bird mar-
kets, together with the screening of imported poultry, were successful 
in keeping H5Nl/97-like viruses out of terrestrial poultry from 1998 
until 2001. But the reassortant viruses found in 2001 seemed to be more 
difficult to exclude, perhaps due to their wider host range and/or more 
efficient transmission among birds. To interrupt the amplification of any 
viruses that might enter the retail markets, a once-a-month "rest-day" 
was introduced. On these rest days, the live bird markets are completely 
emptied of poultry, any remaining poultry are slaughtered to be sold as 
chilled carcasses, and the markets are thoroughly cleaned before being 
restocked the following day. 
Avian Influenza in Hong Kong, 2002-
an Unusual Outbreak in Wild Waterfowl 
Late in 2002, Hong Kong once again had an outbreak with H5N1 
viruses-this time in wild birds. The first episode occurred in Penfold 
Park, a small nature park that contained a number of resident waterfowl 
including geese, ducks, and swans, as well as 
captive psittacine and passerine birds, free-rang-
ing white pigeons, and feral egrets. Neurologic 
disease and unusual deaths were first reported in 
early December. Thirty-one waterfowl died, and 
the remaining ducks and geese were culled on 
December 10. The second outbreak occurred at 
Kowloon Park, located 12 km away. This park 
had an aviary with 35 species of captive free-fly-
ing birds, and a bird lake that housed 26 species 
of captive pinioned waterfowl and flamingos. In 
addition, wild herons were seen at the water-
fowl ponds and five species of feral birds visited 
regularly to scavenge grain from the feeding troughs. The first unusual 
deaths occurred at this park from December 14 to 17, and the first con-
firmed case ofH5N1 avian influenza was reported on December 17. 
Waterfowl have the 
potential to incubate 
avian irifluenza. 
Source: Clint May, ISU 
Emerging & Exotic Diseases of Animals 66 
Kowloon Park, like Penfold Park, was closed, drained, and disinfected. 
All of the remaining resident waterfowl were quarantined. Many ofthe 
birds from the open ponds, including geese, ducks, swans, and flamingos 
died during December; however, the terrestrial and feral birds at these 
parks seemed to be unaffected. At the same time, H5N1 viruses were 
found in dead chickens in live bird markets and on a local chicken farm. 
H5N1 viruses were also isolated from dead little egrets, gray herons and 
other wild migratory birds that overwinter in Hong Kong. More than one 
virus seemed to be responsible for these outbreaks; at least three differ-
ent H5N1 viruses isolated in late 2002 were able to cause severe disease 
and death in experimentally infected ducks. 
Epidemics of avian influenza are very unusual in wild birds. Before 
this outbreak, researchers had seen little or no evolutionary change in the 
avian influenza viruses isolated from wild waterfowl over the last 60 years. 
Therefore, they believed that these viruses were stable in their normal res-
ervoir hosts. Earlier viruses found in Hong Kong, including the H5N1/97 
virus, did not replicate well in ducks and were asymptomatic in this species. 
The repeated outbreaks ofH5N1 viruses in Hong Kong in 1997, 2001, and 
2002 suggested that H5N1 viruses had become widespread in the region, 
and that new pandemic or panzootic strains could emerge through reassort-
ment. There were also other concerns about these viruses. H5N1 viruses 
isolated in the region in 2001 and 2002 were much more variable than the 
H5 viruses isolated in Hong Kong between 1979 and 1997. In addition, it 
was worrisome that some of the new H5N1 isolates could infect the brain 
as well as the respiratory tract in both birds and mammals. During this time, 
there were also hints that viruses pathogenic to humans might be circulat-
ing in Mainland China. In 2003, a H5N1 virus infected two members of a 
Hong Kong family who had traveled to China. The 5-year old son recov-
ered, but his 33-year old father died. Another family member died of a 
respiratory illness while in China, but no testing was done there. 
Avian Influenza in Southeast Asia and Europe, 2003-2005 
In 2003, a new epidemic broke out. This time, it was widespread. 
From late 2003 to March 2004, HPAI (H5N1) viruses were reported 
among poultry, particularly chickens, in Cambodia, China, Indonesia, 
Japan, Laos, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. More than 100 million 
birds died or were culled in an effort to stop the outbreak. In rare instances, 
this virus was able to infect humans; 35 cases were confirmed in Thailand 
and Vietnam, most apparently the result of direct contact with birds. Twen-
ty-four of the human infections were fatal. In many parts of Southeast 
Asia, humans live in close contact with their animals, including poultry. 
This facilitates the spread of influenza viruses between species, and may 
have contributed to the human infections. At first, culling and other mea-
sures appeared to control this virus. By March 2004, the outbreak seemed 
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to be contained in poultry and human infections were no longer being 
reported in most nations. However, beginning in June 2004, a number 
of countries once again began seeing the disease. This time, infected 
poultry were reported in Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thai-
land, Vietnam, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North 
Korea). Human infections were seen in Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, 
Cambodia, and China. In addition, fatal H5Nl infections were reported 
in zoo and domestic cats fed infected poultry, and H5Nl virus transmis-
sion to domestic cats was confirmed in laboratory studies. In some of 
the infected tigers, which lived in a zoo in Thailand, the virus seems to 
have spread horizontally. There were also reports of infected zoo birds 
in Indonesia and pigs in China. In April 2005, a H5Nl virus killed more 
than 6,000 migratory birds at isolated Qinghai Lake in central China. 
Mongolia also reported the death of 89 migratory birds at two lakes in 
August 2005. These various reports were worrisome, as they suggested 
that the H5Nl viruses were adapting to multiple mammalian and avian 
hosts. As of November 2005, more than 150 million poultry had been 
culled or died in this outbreak, which was not yet under control. The U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) warned that the H5Nl 
virus now seemed to have become endemic among birds in Asia. 
In 2005, H5Nl viruses spread beyond Southeast Asia. They were 
first reported in Russia and Kazakhstan. Authorities in these countries 
hoped to confine the virus to Asia by intensive eradication efforts. 
But within a few weeks, a H5Nl virus passed the Ural mountains, 
the boundary between Europe and Asia, and appeared in Turkey and 
Romania, prompting mass culls and fears of a worldwide panzootic. In 
Croatia, a H5 virus was found in dead wild swans at a fish pond. As 
a result, Croatia began to cull poultry in villages near the pond, and 
stopped all bird and poultry exports. In Germany, up to 25 wild geese 
and ducks were found dead at a pond in October 2005, and avian influ-
enza virus was isolated from some ofthese birds. Cases ofH5Nl HPAI 
were also reported in the Aegean Sea islands in Greece. How the H5Nl 
virus entered Europe is unknown, but there are suspicions that migrating 
wild birds might be carrying the virus into new regions. Some nations 
in the European Union mandated or recommended that poultry flocks, 
particularly those located near wetlands, be kept indoors to reduce the 
possibility of virus transmission from this source. In October 2005, the 
United Kingdom reported that the H5Nl virus had been found in mesias 
(a type of bird) that died in quarantine during the import process. Partly 
as a result of this finding, the European Commission banned the impor-
tation ofwild birds into the E.U., with some exceptions allowed under 
special circumstances or quarantine conditions. 
The specific origins and parent viruses of the currently circulating 
H5Nl viruses remain to be determined, but circumstantial evidence sug-
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gests that southern China may be the reservoir. Although they have not . 
been fully characterized yet, these viruses seem to be related to H5N1 
viruses found in Hong Kong from 1997 to 2002. Isolates from South 
Korea resemble the virus found in Penfold Park in 2002. The current 
H5N1 viruses also share some characteristics with one of the genotypes 
found during the 2001 outbreak. There is also some evidence that the 
H5N1 viruses may be evolving as the outbreak continues. Genetic differ-
ences have been reported between the South Korean viruses, which did 
not infect humans, and viruses that infected humans in Vietnam and Thai-
land. Isolates from South Korea, which acted very quickly to contain its 
outbreak, are genetically homogeneous; the H5Nl viruses found in some 
Southeast Asian countries with prolonged outbreaks are heterogeneous. 
Fears of a Human Pandemic 
One of the major concerns in the Southeast Asian outbreak has been 
the ability of the virus to infect humans. Between December 2003 and 
November 29, 2005, 133 human cases and 68 deaths were confirmed 
in Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, and China. Although a few 
of these cases may have been due to limited person-to-person transmis-
sion, the vast majority seemed to be caused by direct contact with poultry. 
However, authorities fear that the current viruses could recombine with 
a human influenza virus and produce an isolate that is more easily trans-
mitted from person to person. An avian virus could also adapt to humans 
without reassortment, if it developed certain mutations. Fears of a new 
human pandemic are fueled, in part, by the recent discovery that the H1N1 
virus responsible for the deadly 1918 pandemic was probably an avian 
influenza virus that became adapted to humans. The H5Nl viruses isolated 
from humans in the current epidemic share certain genetic features with 
the H1N111918 virus. In addition, the human population does not have 
immunity to H5N1; the currently circulating human influenza viruses are 
H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2. 
As a result of this epidemic, countries are establishing plans to protect 
their populations in the event of an avian influenza pandemic in humans. 
Some countries have stockpiled antiviral drugs. A human H5N1 vaccine is 
also in development. Two events - reports of sustained human-to-human 
transmission, or genetic reassortment with human influenza viruses - may 
signal that the H5N1 virus is adapting to humans. As ofNovember 2005, 
neither event had been reported. 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza and the U.S. 
Highly pathogenic avian influenza is a foreign animal disease in the 
U.S. Although outbreaks ofLPAI are relatively common, only three or 
four outbreaks ofHPAI have been recorded in the U.S. since 1900. The 
first, in 1924-1925, was associated with live bird markets. This virus, 
which seemed to be disseminated mainly through the movement of poul-
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try, spread to nine eastern states before being eradicated. HPAI was seen 
again in 1929; it may have been caused by the same virus or it may have 
been a new introduction. This disease was not reported again until the 
autumn of 1983, when a H5N2 virus caused an extensive epidemic in 
Pennsylvania and surrounding states. This virus, which was highly viru-
lent in chickens, turkeys, and guinea fowl, was very similar to a LPAI 
virus that had been circulating in the area for 6 months. As a result, some 
birds had immunity to the HPAI virus, which complicated diagnosis and 
probably helped the virus spread further. Control and eradication of this 
epidemic, which was not completed until 1984, cost over $63 million in 
federal funds and an additional $350 million in increased consumer costs. 
Over 17 million birds died or were slaughtered. There was no evidence 
of transmission to humans. HPAI was not reported again until February 
2004, when a virus was isolated from a south-central Texas broiler chick-
en flock This virus, which also had the subtype H5N2, caused symptoms 
consistent with LPAI in the Texas flock, and was not virulent for experi-
mentally infected chickens. However, some of its genetic characteristics 
suggested that it was a HPAI virus. Researchers also found that further 
changes in its hemagglutinin gene could increase the mortality rate. As 
a result, this virus was designated as a HPAI virus, and the USDA and 
state of Texas culled the approximately 6,600 birds in the flock. Sur-
veillance on all flocks within 10 miles of the affected farm revealed no 
additional cases. No zoonotic infections were reported. 
Like other countries, the U.S. is concerned about the possibility 
that the H5Nl strains from Southeast Asia could enter domestic poultry 
flocks or wild birds. APHIS has re-examined its HPAI prevention and 
eradication plans in light of that epidemic. All imported birds, including 
pet birds of U.S. origin, must now be quarantined and tested for the avi-
an influenza virus before they enter the country. In addition, APHIS has 
placed trade restrictions on the importation of poultry or poultry products 
from countries that have reported cases ofHPAI. Poultry or poultry prod-
ucts from East and Southeast Asia must be processed or cooked before 
importation to destroy any influenza viruses. APHIS has also alerted 
the U.S. Department ofHomeland Security to be particularly vigilant 
in its agricultural inspections of passengers and cargo from Asia, and 
has increased its surveillance of domestic markets for illegally imported 
poultry products. In addition, the USDA is working with the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OlE), the United Nations' Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), and World Health Organization (WHO) 
to help affected countries and their neighbors with disease prevention, 
management, and eradication to reduce the global threat from this virus. 
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Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
in the United Kingdom, 1986-2005 
An epidemic of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (ESE) was first 
recognized in the United Kingdom in 1986. From 1986 to February 2003, 
over 179,900 cattle on more than 3 5,7 4 0 UK. farms were affected. The 
epidemic peaked in January 1993 at almost 1, 000 new cases per week. 
ESE also spread to other European countries that had imported cattle 
from the UK., and eventually a small number of cases were recognized 
in North America. The ESE outbreak may have resulted from the feeding 
of scrapie-containing sheep meat-and-bone meal to cattle or it may have 
arisen as a rare spontaneous formation of a spongiform encephalopa-
thy in a cow that then spread to other cattle through contaminated meat 
and bone meal. There is strong evidence and general agreement that the 
outbreak was amplified by feeding rendered bovine meat-and-bone meal 
to young calves. Most countries have now banned this practice and, as a 
result, the ESE epidemic has been waningfor the last decade. A parallel 
outbreak of new-variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans is 
most likely a result of the consumption of beef products contaminated by 
central nervous system tissue from cattle with ESE. 
As of June 2005,177 cases of vCJD had been report-
ed, mainly in the United Kingdom. Deaths due to 
vCJD peaked in 2000 and have since been declining. 
BSE developed into an epidemic as a consequence 
of an intensive farming practice-the recycling of 
animal protein in ruminant feed. The question of how 
to handle the BSE agent, a known hazard to cattle and 
potential hazard to humans, is key to the BSE story. 
The government took measures to address both haz-
ards, but they were not always timely or adequately 
implemented and enforced because the basic biology 
ofBSE was unknown and it was believed that BSE 
was not a threat to human life. 
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What are BSE and vCJD? 
BSE is a progressive neurological disorder of cattle that results 
from infection by an unconventional transmissible agent. The causative 
agent of BSE and other transmissible spongiform encephalopathies 
(TSEs) is yet to be fully characterized. The BSE agent is smaller than 
most viral particles and is highly resistant to heat, ultraviolet light, 
ionizing radiation, and common disinfectants that normally inactivate 
viruses or bacteria. It causes no detectable immune or inflammatory 
response in the host and has not been observed microscopically. The 
incubation period for BSE ranges from two to eight years and clini-
cal disease usually occurs in older animals. Most cases in the United 
Kingdom were seen in dairy cows between three and six years of age. 
Affected animals may display changes in temperament such as ner-
vousness or aggression, abnormal posture, incoordination and difficulty 
in rising, decreased milk production, or loss of body condition despite 
continued appetite. Following the onset of clinical signs, the animal's 
condition deteriorates until it dies or is destroyed. This usually takes 
from two weeks to six months. There is no treatment. 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) is a rare and fatal human neuro-
degenerative disease ofunknown cause. Patients with the conventional 
form are usually between 50 and 75 years of age. The new variant form 
(vCJD) in the United Kingdom mainly affects younger people; the medi-
an age at death is 28 years. 
The first cases of BSE 
Individual cattle were probably first infected by BSE in the 1970s. 
If they lived long enough to develop signs of disease, these were not 
reported to or investigated by the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) 
of the State Veterinary Service (SVS). The first clinical cases were 
reported in 1984, although it was two years before the nature of the 
disease was actually recognized. 
On December 22, 1984, Peter Stent ofPitsham Farm in Sussex called 
Dr. David Bee, a private veterinarian, to examine Cow 133. The cow had 
an arched back and had lost weight. Dr. Bee visited the farm several times 
over the following months, and continued to see animals showing unusual 
symptoms. Cow 133 developed a head tremor and incoordination before 
dying on February 11, 1985. By the end of April, five more cows on the 
farm had died. Dr. Bee requested assistance from Dr. J. M. Watkin-Jones, a 
veterinarian at the Winchester Veterinary Investigation Center (VIC) of the 
Veterinary Investigation Service. A number of samples of body tissue were 
submitted to the CVL for pathological analysis. Various possible ailments 
were identified, but despite a wide range of tests there was no definite diag-
nosis. The CVL suggested that Mr. Stent submit a live affected cow for 
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slaughter and post-mortem. Cow 142 was sent live to the CVL in Septem-
ber for euthanasia and a post-mortem examination. The pathologist on duty 
examined the tissues and concluded that the problem was associated with 
fungal contamination of feed and mycotoxin production. An April 1985 lab-
oratory report stated that a fungal toxin called citrinin had been found in the 
feed at the farm. New cases ceased to develop on the farm and the veterinar-
ians assumed that the problem had run its course (from www.bseinquiry.gov. 
uk/report/volume3/chapterd.htm). 
The mysterious disease soon reappeared on other farms. At the end 
of 1986, the Pathology Department of the CVL considered four more 
cases of unusual neurologic disease in cattle from farms in Kent and Bris-
tol. They identified these cases as a probable transmissible spongiform 
encephalopathy in cattle and named the new disease bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy. By the end of 1987, the CVL Epidemiology Department 
concluded that the cause of the reported cases ofBSE was the consump-
tion of meat-and-bone meal (MBM), which was made from animal 
carcasses and incorporated into cattle feed. At first it was thought that 
cattle were becoming infected from scrapie-contaminated sheep tissues 
and that the MBM had become infectious because rendering methods that 
had previously inactivated the conventional scrapie agent were changed. 
However, the cases of BSE identified between 1986 and 1988 were not 
index cases, and they were not the result of the transmission of scrapie. 
They were the consequences of recycling BSE-infected cattle into MBM. 
In addition, the theory that BSE resulted from changes in rendering meth-
ods is probably not correct because rendering methods have never been 
capable of completely inactivating TSEs. Although the origin of the dis-
ease will probably never be known, BSE probably originated from a novel 
source early in the 1970s, possibly a cow or other animal that developed 
the disease spontaneously. The disease did not become apparent until the 
agent had been disseminated to large numbers of cattle via MBM and, 
after a long incubation period, these cattle began developing clinical signs. 
Precautions taken 
In June 1988, the Southwood Working Party, set up to provide advice 
on the implications ofBSE, recommended that cattle showing signs of 
BSE be destroyed and that compensation be paid to farmers. In February 
1989, the Southwood Working Party submitted a report to the government 
that concluded that the risk of transmission of BSE to humans appeared 
remote and that 'it was most unlikely that BSE would have any implica-
tions for human health.' This assessment of risk was made assuming that 
BSE was probably derived from scrapie and could be expected to behave 
like scrapie. The Southwood Report never underwent a scientific review 
by experts in the field. Precautionary measures were put in place that went 
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beyond those recommended by the Working Party and an 
expert committee was set up to advise BSE research. 
Once MBM was identified as the probable vector of BSE 
in 1988, the government implemented a ban on incorporat-
ing ruminant protein in ruminant feed. This ban reduced 
the escalating rate of infection. After BSE was experimen-
tally transmitted to a pig in 1990, new measures to protect 
pigs and poultry from BSE were introduced. However, the 
measures were unenforceable and widely disregarded. It 
was later discovered that a cow could become infected with 
the BSE agent by eating an amount of infectious tissue as 
small as a peppercorn. Cross-contamination in feedmills 
caused thousands of cattle to become infected, but because 
of the long incubation period this was not apparent until later. In 
1994, because of the continuing infection, regulations were revised and 
a rigorous enforcement campaign was initiated. After March 1996, the 
incorporation of all animal protein in animal feed was banned. The BSE 
epidemic in the United Kingdom peaked in 1993 and, as a result of these 
control measures, has subsided. 
Recognition of the potential risks to humans 
In June 1989, specified bovine offal (SBO) was banned from use in 
human food as a precaution. Specified bovine offal includes the brain, 
spinal cord, spleen, thymus, tonsils, and intestines of cattle. At the time 
of the ban, some questioned whether all of the spinal cord could be 
removed during the abattoir process. Questions were also raised about 
the process of mechanical recovery of scraps left attached to the ver-
tebral column for use in human food (mechanically recovered meat). 
Instances of failure to remove all of the spinal cord from the carcass 
were discovered and in December 1995, the extraction of mechanically 
recovered meat from the spinal column of cattle was banned. Mechani-
cally recovered meat can include dorsal root ganglia that have been 
demonstrated to be infectious in the late stages of incubation. 
In May 1990, a domestic cat was diagnosed as suffering from a 
'scrapie-like' spongiform encephalopathy. This generated widespread 
public and media concern that BSE had been transmitted to the cat and 
might also be transmissible to humans. As time passed, the increasing 
knowledge about BSE made the theory that it would behave like scra-
pie less and less viable. The public was not informed of any change in 
the perceived likelihood that BSE might be transmissible to humans 
and in fact was repeatedly reassured that it was safe to eat beef. There 
was, nevertheless, some recognition that the pathways by which bovine 
products or by-products might come into contact with humans or other 
animals needed to be examined. Known or suspected pathways included 
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meat, vaccines, cosmetics, surgical instruments, bovine or human tissues, 
agricultural fertilizer, and agricultural waste. However, no coordinated 
consideration was implemented until March 1996. 
The first human cases 
Scientists suspected that ifBSE were to spread to humans it would 
resemble Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. In 1991, surveillance for atypical 
cases or changing patterns of CJD was put in place. Three dairy farmers 
who had had BSE in their herds were diagnosed with CJD in August 1992, 
July 1993, and December 1994. The fourth annual report of the CJD Sur-
veillance Unit (CJDSU), issued in August 1995, noted the apparently high 
incidence of CJD in farmers. The Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory 
Committee (SEAC) released a press release about suspected CJD in a 
cattle farmer in October 1995. 
In May 1995, Stephen Churchill, age 18, died. He was later confirmed 
as the first known victim ofvCJD. His was one of three vCJD deaths in 
1995. The CJDSU identified its second suspect vCJD death in a remark-
ably young patient in August 1995. A third individual died in November 
1995. Both cases were later confirmed as vCJD. The CJDSU announced 
the emergence of vCJD and on March 16, 1996, the SEAC announced that 
the most likely explanation for the cases of a new variant of CJD in young 
people was exposure to BSE. This has since been compellingly supported 
by scientific evidence. A policy of banning consumption of cattle over 30 
months of age was introduced. However, the incubation period for trans-
missible spongiform encephalopathies is long and, not surprisingly, cases 
of vCJD continue to be diagnosed. Annual vCJD-related deaths in the U.K. 
rose gradually to a high of 28 in 2000, and tapered to nine in 2004. Three 
deaths were reported from January 1, 2005 to October 8, 2005, bringing 
the total number of deaths in the U.K. to 151. As of June 2005, 177 cases 
ofvCJD had been reported worldwide, including one from the U.S. in 
2002. Nearly all of these people had lived in the U.K. during multiple 
years between 1980 and 1996 and had been exposed to BSE there. 
BSE outside the United Kingdom 
When the BSE epidemic became evident, the European Union pro-
hibited the export from the U.K. oflive bovine animals, their semen 
and embryos, mammalian-derived MBM, or the meat of bovine animals 
slaughtered in the U.K. that is liable to enter the animal feed or human 
food chain. The export of materials destined for use in medicinal products, 
cosmetics, or pharmaceuticals was also banned. Despite these measures, 
BSE spread to countries outside the U.K. Eighteen European countries 
have reported at least one case of BSE in indigenous cattle. Portugal had 
the highest incidence rate; in 2001, it reported more than 100 indigenous 
cases per million cattle aged over 24 months. Significant numbers of cases 
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processing facilities to reduce the risks to human health. In addition, 
APHIS undertook an intensified testing program to determine whether 
BSE currently exists in U.S. cattle and at what level. This program, 
which began in June 2004, will test as many high-risk animals as pos-
sible over a 12- to 18-month period, as a one-time 'snapshot' of the BSE 
picture in the U.S. Most of the samples are being taken from high-risk 
animals such as downer cattle, cattle with neurological disease, emaci-
ated or injured cattle, and dead cattle. A limited number of older, normal 
cattle are also being randomly tested. The carcasses of the tested animals 
are not allowed to enter the food chain until testing is negative. The 
USDA estimates that this surveillance can detect one infected animal in 
10 million if 201,000 cattle are tested, given the assumption that all posi-
tives are in the high-risk population. 
As of October 2005, the intensified surveillance has found one case 
ofBSE in an indigenous animal. A 12 year old Brahma cross cow from 
Texas was sold in a livestock sale and transported to a packing plant. The 
animal, which was dead on arrival, was sent on to a pet food plant, where 
it was sampled for BSE. The carcass was incinerated and was not used in 
pet food. The test results on this animal were initially conflicting, but in 
June 2005, a sample sent to a BSE reference laboratory in the U.K. was 
determined to be positive. APHIS, the FDA, the Texas Animal Health 
Commission and the Texas Feed and Fertilizer Control Service conducted 
a joint investigation to determine the source of the infection and test the 
infected cow's cohorts and offspring. The infected animal was traced to 
the ranch in Texas where it had been born and raised. All adult animals 
that left this farm after 1990, and the two calves born to the infected cow 
within 2 years of its death were traced. Most of these animals had been 
slaughtered, died or were presumed to be dead, although a few animals 
were untraceable. One surviving animal was tested and found to be nega-
tive, and another was determined to be of no interest due to its age. As the 
BSE-infected cow had been born before the USDA implemented the ban 
on MBM in ruminant feeds in 1997, it appears to have been infected from 
that source. 
As of October 8, 2005, the surveillance program has tested more 
than 484,000 cattle, with no additional positive animals found. However, 
because of these two BSE cases, a number of countries have banned the 
importation of a variety of ruminant products or live animals from the U.S. 
These bans vary greatly. While some nations now prohibit the importa-
tion of all U.S. beef, others have placed only temporary or limited bans, 
such as a ban on beef products from Texas and Washington states. Some 
countries allow certain products from animals of a specified age or under 
specific conditions. 
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Canine Influenza, 2004-2005 
Viruses rarely jump from one species into another. When they do, the 
outbreak tends to be brief; typically, the virus is poorly adapted to the new 
host and cannot be transmitted efficiently in the new species. Two char-
acteristics of irifluenza viruses - their high mutation rate and their ability 
to recombine with each other - help them adapt to new species. Although 
most cross-species infections by these viruses are self-limited, there are 
records of a few permanent jumps. One is currently occurring in dogs, 
which have acquired an equine influenza virus from horses. 
In January 2004, 22 racing greyhounds at a Florida racetrack became 
ill with an unknown respiratory disease. Fourteen of the dogs developed a 
fever, followed by a persistent cough that lasted for 10 to 14 days. These 
dogs recovered. Eight other dogs died suddenly with evidence of hemor-
rhages in the respiratory tract. At necropsy, the fatal cases had signs of 
severe hemorrhagic pneumonia. Using lung tissue samples from the dead 
dogs, researchers discovered an influenza A virus that was very similar to 
a H3N8 equine influenza virus circulating in horses. All of the genes in 
the canine virus were of equine origin, suggesting that the virus had been 
transmitted whole from horses into dogs. Serology using paired acute and 
convalescent sera demonstrated that the recovered dogs had also been 
infected by this virus. Some asymptomatic dogs that had been exposed 
during the outbreak also seroconverted. In addition, it became apparent 
that the canine influenza virus had been circulating among greyhounds in 
Florida for several years. Some Florida racetracks had experienced out-
breaks of an unknown respiratory disease from 1999 to 2003; seropositive 
dogs were found at these tracks. Antibodies to the virus were not found in 
canine serum samples from 1996 to 1998. The same virus, or a very similar 
one, was also found in preserved lung tissues from a greyhound that died of 
an unknown respiratory disease in 2003. At first, the canine influenza virus 
did not seem to be a threat to other breeds of dogs. Experimentally infected 
beagles developed a fever, but no respiratory signs. 
In 2004 and 2005, canine influenza continued to be reported in grey-
hounds. Between June and August 2004, outbreaks of respiratory disease 
were seen at 14 greyhound racetracks in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Kan-
sas, Texas, and West Virginia. Some of these outbreaks were linked to the 
canine influenza virus and others were not investigated. From January to 
May 2005, more episodes were seen. The disease affected greyhounds at 20 
tracks in Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Massachu-
setts, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia. The evidence that the new 
virus was circulating widely in racing greyhounds made researchers suspect 
that it might become a threat to other breeds of dogs. Serology on dogs 
with respiratory disease in shelters and veterinary clinics in Florida and 
New York revealed evidence of the virus in pets and prompted state offi-
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cials to issue a warning to the public. Recently, cases of canine influenza 
were identified in pets in other states including California and Washington. 
It now appears that this virus may be an unrecognized cause of respiratory 
disease in dogs throughout the U.S. 
What are influenza viruses and how 
do they jump from species to species? 
Influenza is caused by influenza viruses, members of the Orthomyxo-
virus family: There are three genera of these viruses: influenzavirus A, 
influenzavirus B and influenzavirus C. The influenza B and C viruses 
mainly infect humans, while the influenza A viruses also infect other 
mammals and birds. Influenza A viruses are classified into subtypes 
based on two proteins, the hemagglutinin ('H') and neuraminidase ('N'). 
There are at least 16 different hemagglutinin antigens (Hl to H16) and 
9 neuraminidase antigens (Nl to N9). Antibodies to the hemagglutinin 
and neuraminidase proteins are important in immunity to these viruses. 
The H and N proteins also help the virus attach to cells and aid in releas-
ing newly formed viruses from a cell; therefore, these proteins help 
determine the species specificity of each influenza virus. However, these 
proteins are not the only ones important in adapting the virus to a spe-
cies; internal virus proteins must also have a good 'fit' with the cell if 
the virus is to efficiently replicate and spread. Wild birds, particularly 
waterfowl, are the reservoirs for the influenza A viruses; these birds carry 
all of the subtypes but rarely become ill themselves. The avian influenza 
viruses are sometimes transmitted to poultry, which may cause outbreaks 
of avian influenza in these birds. Some influenza viruses have become 
adapted to mammals. They include the equine influenza viruses, swine 
influenza viruses, and human influenza viruses. The equine, swine, and 
human viruses are now well adapted to their host species and are not eas-
ily transmitted to other species of mammals or birds. 
Although jumps from one species to another are rare, they are aided 
by the influenza virus' tendency to change. Influenza viruses quickly 
accumulate small mutations, a process called 'antigenic drift.' In addi-
tion, they can exchange proteins with other influenza viruses, an ability 
facilitated by their segmented genome. If two influenza viruses infect 
a cell simultaneously, the segments may mix when new virus particles 
are assembled. An influenza virus can 'reassort' with any other influ-
enza virus, regardless of its origin. For example, if a cell is infected by a 
swine and a human influenza virus, the new viruses budding from that 
cell might contain some pieces from the swine influenza virus and other 
pieces from the human influenza virus- a process that could make the 
swine virus better able to infect human cells. Reassortment is particularly 
common in pigs, which have receptors for the human, swine and avian 
influenza viruses. Sometimes, an influenza virus can also jump 'whole' 
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from one species to another. Such jumps have been seen when avian influ-
enza viruses infected people, cats, mink, seals, horses and other animals, 
and swine influenza viruses infected humans and turkeys. Usually, the virus 
is poorly adapted to the new species, can't be transmitted efficiently, and 
quickly dies out. Occasionally, a virus is able to replicate and spread well 
in the new hosts, and a permanent jump is made. Such permanent jumps 
were seen in 1918, when pigs acquired their first influenza viruses, and in 
China in 1989, when horses were infected by a new kind of equine influ-
enza virus. Until recently, no influenza viruses circulated in dogs or cats. 
Where did the canine influenza virus come from? 
An analysis ofthe canine influenza virus isolated from greyhound lung 
tissue has demonstrated that this virus is most closely related the H3N8 
"Florida lineage" equine influenza virus that emerged in the early 1990s. 
There are four amino acid differences between the hemagglutinin proteins 
in the equine and canine viruses; these changes were probably important 
in adapting the virus to dogs. Although it's remotely possible that this 
virus was repeatedly introduced into dogs from some other species, the 
evidence suggests that a single virus was transmitted whole from horses to 
dogs, as a one-time event. Transmission between dogs probably occurs via 
aerosols, similarly to other influenza viruses. However, canine influenza 
viruses have, so far, proven impossible to isolate from naturally infected, 
live animals, possibly because virus isolation has always been attempted 
relatively late in the infection, after the symptoms have appeared. 
What can we expect from the canine influenza virus? 
Canine influenza is an emerging disease in dogs. Dogs are not expect-
ed to have any naturally-acquired or vaccine-induced immunity to this 
virus, and some experts warn that the canine population may be facing a 
pandemic similar to the influenza pandemics that swept through humans 
in 1918, 1957 and 1968, or swine in 1918. Although early 
reports suggested that canine influenza was limited to 
greyhounds, all dogs regardless of breed or age are now 
considered to be susceptible. In kennels, the infection rate 
may reach 100% and symptoms may be seen in 75% of 
the dogs infected. Most dogs are expected to develop the 
less severe form of the disease, and recover. In this form, 
the major symptom is a cough that may persist for up to 
3 weeks, in spite of treatment. Occasionally, the cough 
is accompanied by a fever and/ or a nasal discharge that 
responds to antibiotics. A few dogs develop a more severe 
form with pneumonia and possibly pulmonary hemorrhages. 
In dogs with severe disease, the overall mortality rate is 
thought to be 1-5%. However, as experience with this virus 
grows, these numbers may be adjusted up or down; some 
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sources suggest that the mortality rate may be as high as 10%, while 
others expect a high prevalence of mild, self-limiting or asymptomatic 
infections and suggest that the overall mortality rate in pets will be less 
than 1%. A vaccine for dogs, based on the equine influenza vaccine, is in 
development and may be available soon. 
Once some dogs develop either naturally-acquired or vaccine-
induced immunity to this virus, any epidemic or pandemic will probably 
subside. However, all influenza viruses constantly acquire small changes 
and periodic outbreaks may continue, similar to the yearly flu epidemics 
in humans or outbreaks of equine influenza in horses. 
Are there any public health concerns about this virus? 
There is currently no evidence that any other species, including 
humans, can be infected by the canine influenza virus. However, some 
experts are concerned that, due to their close associations with humans, 
dogs might become a source of novel influenza virus transmission to 
humans. As a precaution, physicians, veterinarians and others have been 
asked to report any cases of human influenza that seem to be linked to 
exposure to canine influenza. 
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Classical Swine Fever in Great Britain, 2000 
This is an example of how the British veterinary irifrastructure was able 
to trace, control, and eradicate an outbreak of classical swine fever before 
the disease became widespread. Classical swine fever is an exotic disease 
that has been eradicated from a number of developed countries; however, it 
still exists in some parts of the world and could be re-introduced at any time 
in irifected animals or animal products. 
On August 4, 2000, a suspected case of classical swine fever (CSF) in 
a pig herd was reported to the British Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, 
and Food (MAFF) Animal Health Divisional Office at Bury St Edmunds, 
Suffolk. The herd consisted of 3,500 weaned pigs in seven houses. The 
pigs had been ill since July 11, when weaned pigs had been introduced 
from a breeding/multiplier unit. The infection had spread to four houses 
and as of August 4, a total of 1,110 pigs were ill and about 200 had died. 
A MAFF veterinary officer visited the premises the same day and, after 
examining the pigs on site, placed the holding under official movement 
restrictions and took blood samples to test the pigs for classical and Afri-
can swine fever. On August 7, two cases of suspected classical swine 
fever were reported on other farms. One case was in a herd of rearing 
pigs. The second was in a breeding herd that had supplied weaned pigs to 
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the other two infected farms. Both herds were immediately placed under 
quarantine and blood samples were sent for laboratory examination. 
An outbreak of classical swine fever was declared on August 8, 
2000. National and local crisis centers were established to deal with 
the outbreak. Three-kilometer protection and 10-kilometer surveil-
lance zones were established around the infected premises and the 
movement of all pigs within the zones was prohibited. The remaining 
3,300 pigs on the first identified farm were killed on August 10 and 
their carcasses destroyed by rendering. The premises were cleaned and 
disinfected on August 11. The other two farms were also depopulated. 
The movements of pigs, feedstuffs, vehicles, and people onto and off 
the premises were traced to identify possible sources of the virus and 
limit the spread of infection. 
During the next few months, classical swine fever was found on sev-
eral more farms. Before the first farm had been placed under quarantine, 
it had sent infected pigs to four other premises. The disease also spread 
to two contiguous outdoor pig farms. From one of those, classical swine 
fever spread to another contiguous holding and then, through the move-
ment of pigs, to two additional premises. Two more outbreaks occurred 
in pig units owned by haulage operators. A total of 16 infected sites were 
confirmed in Great Britain between August 4 and November 3. However, 
by December the outbreak had been contained. All controls relating to 
the 16 infected premises were lifted on December 30, 2000. 
What is classical swine fever? 
Classical swine fever, also known as hog cholera, is a contagious 
febrile disease of pigs. This disease is caused by infection with the 
classical swine fever virus, a member of the Pestivirus genus of the Fla-
viviridae family ofRNA viruses. Pigs can become infected by ingestion, 
inhalation, genital (semen) infection, or wound contamination. Classical 
swine fever is most easily spread by contact with infected pigs or the 
feeding of inadequately cooked garbage (swill). Spread of the virus by 
fomites or by biting insects is also possible. The clinical signs include 
lethargy, yellow diarrhea, conjunctivitis, incoordination, fever, and 
excessive thirst. Additional signs include skin lesions ranging from cya-
notic patches on the ears and abdomen to raised, scabby lesions mainly 
on the legs. Classical swine fever strongly resembles African swine fever 
and must be distinguished from it by laboratory tests. 
Tracing the virus' footsteps 
The source of the outbreak appears to have been the breeding farm 
identified on August 7. The epidemiological inquiry found that the CSF 
virus probably entered the breeding unit on May 1 then spread to the 
index farm and herd of rearing pigs by the movement of infected pigs. 
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These three farms were all owned by or contracted to the U.K.'s largest 
outdoor pig rearing company. The company's pigs were born on breed-
ing units and remained there for approximately three to four weeks before 
being moved to rearing premises where they remained for a further six 
to eight weeks. From the rearing units, the pigs moved to finishing units 
where they remained for 10 weeks before being slaughtered. This method 
of swine production was designed to reduce the transmission of enzootic 
diseases by early weaning of pigs from the breeding farm to a series of 
remote locations. Disease transmission from older finishing pigs to young 
growing pigs is avoided by having a series of separate finishing farms. 
All rearing and finishing premises that had received pigs born after 
May 1 at the breeding unit were traced, tested for classical swine fever, and 
placed under official movement restrictions. All the pigs on premises that 
had received pigs born after June 1 were treated as "dangerous contacts" 
and were destroyed. The other 4 7 breeding herds owned by or contracted 
to the production company were traced, placed under quarantine, clinically 
inspected by a MAFF veterinary officer, and sampled for evidence of CSF. 
The government traced the movements of the transporter who took weaned 
pigs from the breeding premises. All the premises that the transporter visited 
were tested and placed under official movement restrictions. 
The origin of the virus and its route of introduction were not estab-
lished with complete certainty. However, the evidence strongly suggests 
that infection did not come through the introduction of infected pigs, 
contact with feral pigs, contaminated vehicles or personnel, discharges of 
effluent, or contaminated vaccines or biological products. It appears more 
likely that the infection was introduced in contaminated pig meat in food 
discarded by people; a public footpath runs adjacent to the outdoor pad-
docks containing dry sows on the breeding farm. Genetic typing showed 
that the outbreak was caused by a virus strain that is not currently present 
in Europe. This strain is in the same genetic group that was isolated during 
a classical swine fever outbreak in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Spain in 1997- 98. 
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Foot and Mouth Disease in the United Kingdom, 2001 
This is example of how foot and mouth disease can spread in a coun-
try with a veterinary infrastructure similar to that of the United States 
and how the international community reacted to an outbreak in the U.K. 
Outbreaks of foot and mouth disease cause major economic and trad-
ing difficulties for infected countries. Because the disease can spread on 
fomites as well as between animals, it can sweep through a country rap-
idly in spite of control measures. 
How it began 
On February 19, 2001, a veterinary inspector from the State Veteri-
nary Service of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), 
undertaking routine inspections at an abattoir at Little Warley near Brent-
wood, Essex, saw vesicular lesions on 27 sows and one boar. Vesicles 
(skin blisters) are a characteristic symptom of foot and mouth disease 
(FMD). Vesicles caused by FMD are clinically indistinguishable from 
those caused by other vesicular diseases such as vesicular stomatitis, 
swine vesicular disease, or vesicular exanthema of swine. In this case, 
laboratory tests confirmed the disease to be foot and mouth disease. On 
February 20, MAFF announced an immediate "stop movement" of all 
susceptible livestock in the United Kingdom, including the movement of 
animals to abattoirs, sale markets, and pastures. 
Efforts to trace the disease back to the infected farm and suppress the 
outbreak began immediately. The infected pigs had arrived at the abattoir 
on February 16 from farms in Buckinghamshire and the Isle of Wight. 
The pigs were traced back to a farm at Heddon-on-the-wall, Northumber-
land. By the time the outbreak was discovered, foot and mouth disease 
had spread to a cluster of holdings in the County of Essex through the 
movement of pigs and people and local airborne spread. Infected sheep 
from the farm at Heddon-on-the-wall had also been moved to the Long-
town market near Carlisle. These sheep infected thousands of additional 
sheep and cattle holdings in other parts of Great Britain, initially through 
the movement of sheep through markets and subsequently by local 
spread around infected holdings. 
What is foot and mouth disease? 
Foot and mouth disease is a highly infectious viral disease that can 
affect all cloven-hoofed animals including cattle, swine, deer, goats, 
and sheep. More rarely, it affects hedgehogs, rats, elephants, giraffes, 
and antelopes. The FMD virus is spread in aerosols and on fomites 
such as manure-contaminated tires, boots, and clothing. The disease is 
characterized by fever and vesicles, which progress to erosions in the 
mouth, nares, muzzle, feet, or teats. In cattle, oral lesions are common, 
with vesicles on the tongue, dental pad, gums, soft palate, nostrils, or 
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muzzle. Hoof lesions can be found in the area of the coronary band and 
interdigital space. The erosions are quite painful and affected animals 
are lame, refuse to eat, and may lose weight. The mouth lesions can 
cause profuse salivation. Sheep and goats show very mild, if any, signs. 
Animals generally recover in about two weeks but secondary infections 
may lead to a longer recovery time. 
How it entered the U.K. 
Seven immunogically different serotypes of the FMD virus are known 
to exist. The virus in the U.K. was identified as serotype "0" Pan-Asian. 
This strain was first recognized in India in 1990 and has since spread to a 
number of countries around the world. It is identical to the virus found in 
recent outbreaks in Africa, including one in South Africa where the virus 
was traced to pig swill-waste food from human tables-sold illegally 
from an Asian boat. 
The source of the 2001 epizootic in the U.K. is also thought to have 
been pig swill. The feeding of pig swill is a practice that has been going 
on for generations. Today, pig swill comes from restaurants, schools, and 
anywhere humans eat and waste food on a large scale. In recent years, the 
feeding of pig swill has declined because it is thought to be inefficient and 
outmoded. In 1998, a government panel of agricultural experts advised 
that it be banned; however, the advice was rejected by ministers who did 
not want to impose new costs on hard-pressed farmers. Only about one 
percent of producers in the U.K. were using pig swill at the time of the 
outbreak. Farmers are supposed to treat the swill by heating it to 100 
degrees centigrade to kill potential pathogens. MAFF officials suspect that 
the infectious swill originated as waste food from a ship or international 
restaurant that was not properly heat-treated. 
The spread 
By March 2, foot and mouth disease had spread to 40 locations, with 
many linked to infected markets. A total of 25,000 animals had been 
destroyed and incinerated on-farm. An outbreak was also confirmed in 
County Armagh in Northern Ireland. (The term "outbreak" used here 
refers to infections at a farm or abattoir that was previously uninfected.) 
On March 9, there were cases in 127 locations. The MAFF sent informa-
tion to farmers and veterinarians on how to avoid spreading FMD and how 
to report suspected outbreaks. It also publicized the details of the clinical 
signs of FMD in sheep, as the symptoms in this species can be subtle. 
At the start of the outbreak, MAFF veterinarians who had been on 
infected premises were required not to have contact with uninfected, 
susceptible animals for five days. A shortage of "clean" unexposed vet-
erinarians quickly developed. Private practice veterinarians and foreign 
government veterinarians were enlisted to help with the outbreak. The U.S. 
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sent the first group of 20 veterinarians the week of March 5. One month 
after the start of the outbreak, MAFF decreased the time required to 
become "clean" from five to three days to enable more veterinarians to 
investigate potentially infected premises. Eventually the time required 
to become "clean" decreased to 24 hours to visit a highly suspect farm. 
Veterinary teams for infected premises, surveillance, and trace back 
from sale markets were established to better utilize personnel. 
The control measures implemented by MAFF resulted in a number 
of difficulties. Because of the restriction of animal movement, cows 
could not cross roads for milking or be moved to fresh grazing pastures. 
Pregnant ewes were prevented from moving to shelter for lambing. 
There was a public outcry to allow some animal movement for wel-
fare reasons. To reduce the transmission of virus by humans, footpaths 
in the countryside were closed and the public was strongly discour-
aged from going anywhere near livestock farms. Carcass disposal also 
became a problem. The MAFF initially planned to render the carcasses 
of destroyed livestock rather than incinerate them on-farm. However, 
the large number of carcasses resulted in a lack of sealed trucks for 
hauling carcasses to rendering plants, delays in burial, and shortages of 
material for incineration. The National Farmers Union (NFU) protested 
the delay of several days in destroying infected animals and burning 
carcasses. About one month after the start of the outbreak the military 
became involved to coordinate the disposal of carcasses. 
In spite of control measures, the epidemic continued to spread and 
cases began to appear outside the U.K. On March 13, FMD was con-
firmed at La Baroche-Gondouin in northwestern France. The infected 
farm was already in a movement control zone, put in place around a 
sheep farm that had imported sheep from the U.K. two weeks earlier. 
The sheep had been preventively slaughtered at that time. Six cattle on 
the farm showed symptoms of FMD, and the entire herd of 114 cattle 
was destroyed. On March 15, the MAFF made the decision to "ring 
depopulate" in the U.K. A ring was defined as three kilometers around an 
infected premises. A total of 251 farms were infected on March 15 and 
about a million healthy animals were scheduled to be killed. The media 
called it "the mass cull." On March 20, FMD was found in the Republic 
of Ireland; typical FMD lesions were detected in sheep on a farm only 
four miles away from the single outbreak which occurred in Northern 
Ireland. The farm was within the surveillance zone established after this 
earlier incident. The source of the Republic of Ireland outbreak was 
believed to be sheep imported via N. Ireland from mainland U.K. 
On March 21, FMD was confirmed in four cows on a farm in the 
Netherlands. Temporary restrictions were imposed throughout the coun-
try on the movement of cattle, poultry, transport vehicles for cattle and 
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poultry, and the semen, ova, and embryos ofungulates. All animals on 
the affected farm were immediately culled. The animals on the six farms 
within a one-kilometer radius of the infected holding were also destroyed. 
Animals were either buried on the farm or burned. All farms within a 
radius of three kilometers of the affected farm were inspected for signs 
ofFMD. The FMD virus is believed to have reached the Netherlands via 
a shipment of veal calves from the Republic of Ireland. The calves were 
rested in an animal holding near Barouche Gondouin, France for 12 hours, 
where they were apparently infected by sheep coming from the U.K. On 
March 23, to fight the spread ofFMD, European Union veterinarians 
in Brussels agreed to limited emergency vaccination in the Netherlands 
around infected farms and animals awaiting slaughter. This overturned the 
15-year E.U. policy of prohibiting vaccination for FMD. 
On March 30, there were 60 new outbreaks in the U.K., the highest dai-
ly total of the epidemic so far, with a total of 839 outbreaks to that date. The 
farming and tourism industries had by this point been devastated, and even 
politics was affected. On April 2, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced 
that the general election scheduled for May 3 would be delayed until June 7 
because of the FMD crisis. However, the severe control measures eventual-
ly succeeded in controlling the epidemic. By June 12 the spread had slowed; 
only four new locations were affected that day, bringing the total number 
of new outbreaks to 1,736. By this time, over 3,281,000 animals had been 
slaughtered, and 8,334 premises had been affected. 
The international reaction 
The U.K. was required to notify the World Organization for Animal 
Health (OlE) of the outbreak within 24 hours of the first case. On the fol-
lowing day, February 21, the European Commission banned the export of 
live animals, germplasm, fresh meat, meat products, milk and milk prod-
ucts, hides, and skins of FMD susceptible species from all of the U.K. 
The U.S./USDA response 
Immediately after FMD was confirmed in the U.K., the USDA 
stepped up its efforts to guard against FMD. The importation of swine, 
ruminants, any fresh swine or ruminant meat (chilled or frozen), and 
other products of swine and ruminant origin from the European Union 
was temporarily prohibited. Travelers were prevented from carrying into 
the U.S. any agricultural products, particularly animal products from the 
European Union that could spread the disease. Security was tightened at 
ports of entry and airports to ensure that passengers, luggage, and cargo 
were checked as appropriate. The USDA also heightened the alert and 
coordination with state agriculture officials and other USDA officials 
stationed around the globe to monitor the situation, and developed a pub-
lic education campaign that included additional signs in airports, public 
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service announcements, an information hotline, website, and other tools 
to inform the public about the issue. In addition, the U.S. sent a team of 
experts to the European Union to monitor, evaluate, and assist in con-
tainment efforts. 
As the FMD outbreak grew in the U.K., the USDA also established 
an emergency operations center to coordinate communication, answer 
technical questions, and provide consumer and traveler information 
about FMD and other related issues. In addition, the USDA reviewed its 
current Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service programs and staff-
ing to ensure appropriate resources were available to prevent the entry of 
FMD into the United States, both short and long-term. Federal and state 
emergency operations plans were also reviewed to ensure that appropri-
ate response mechanisms were in place to act quickly if FMD were ever 
to enter the United States. 
Final statistics 
The last case ofthis outbreak was reported on September 30, 2001, 
bringing the total number of confirmed cases in the U.K. to 2,030. 
Many more animals had been killed to prevent the spread of the dis-
ease. According to official U.K. government figures, 4,068,000 animals 
were culled between the first case on February 20, 2001 and the last 
case on September 30, 2001. Unofficial figures from the Meat and 
Livestock Commission put the number of animals slaughtered at more 
than 10 million. Those figures include animals slaughtered for welfare 
reasons such as dwindling feed and space, animals killed because there 
was no market for them, and animals killed with their mothers and only 
counted as one animal. On January 22, 2002, the OlE declared that the 
U.K. had regained its previously recognized FMD-free status without 
vaccination, clearing the way for international export trade in animals 
and animal products. 
Sources of Information 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), U.K. Foot and mouth disease. 
Available at: http://www.defra.gov.uk/footandmouth/. Accessed 2003. 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov:80/oa/fmd/informwp.html. *Accessed 2003. 
International Society for Infectious Diseases. Promed-Mail. Available at: http://www.promedmail. 
org. Accessed 2003. 
PigHealth.com. Available at: http://www.pighealth.com. Accessed 2003.Reviewed by: 
Dr. Larry Ludemann, USDA APHIS, VS, Center for Veterinary Biologics, and a veterinarian 
assigned to assist with the outbreak in the U.K. in spring 2001. 
*defunct link as of 2004 
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Foot and Mouth Disease in Uruguay, 2001 
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) also occurred in Uruguay at the 
same time as the epidemic in the UK. Although these two countries are 
approximately the same size, their livestock composition is quite different. 
Uruguay has nearly seven times as many cattle as the UK. (1 0. 6 million 
compared to 1.6 million) but fewer sheep and pigs. Faced with a similar 
number of FMD-infected farms, the two countries' approach to this dis-
ease was drastically different. The UK. used a stamping-out policy with 
no vaccination, while Uruguay culled few animals and concentrated its 
efforts on a massive vaccination campaign. In the UK., more than 6 mil-
lion animals were killed. In Uruguay, a little over 6,900 animals were 
killed, and over 24 million doses of vaccine were used. The two outbreaks 
lasted about the same time, but the overall cost to control the epidemic 
was far less in Uruguay. The FMD outbreak in the UK. is estimated to 
have cost approximately $5 billion to agriculture and the food chain and 
an additional $5 billion from loss of tourism. The cost of the outbreak in 
Uruguay was $243.6 million, with much of this due to the loss of export 
markets. This outbreak illustrates how vaccination can be effective in con-
trolling and eradicating FMD. 
In 1987, the countries of South America established the Hemispheric 
Plan for the Eradication of Foot and Mouth Disease (PHEFA). Under this 
plan, comprehensive vaccination with modem, improved vaccines is the 
backbone of eradication efforts, but depopulation is also conducted if the 
disease threatens a disease-free region. The adoption of PHEF A led to a 
decrease in the number of FMD outbreaks reported in South America from 
955 in 1990 to 130 in 1999. The adoption ofPHEFA also strengthened vet-
erinary systems overall and promoted private sector cooperation in control 
and eradication activities, resulting in an overall improvement in national 
animal health programs and services in nearly all countries. 
Livestock breeding is the major agricultural activity in Uruguay, and a 
significant contributor to its economy. In 2001, Uruguay had 10.6 million 
cattle, 12.1 million sheep, 480,000 horses, and 270,000 pigs. Livestock 
production represents more than 65 percent of all Uruguayan exports. The 
presence ofFMD, however, places significant restrictions on trade. In the 
1990s, the European Union decided to stop general vaccination for FMD, 
prompting South American meat-exporting countries to discontinue vac-
cination if possible and acquire a more favorable trade status. In 1994, 
Uruguay was recognized by the OlE as "FMD free where vaccination is 
practiced." In the same year, it discontinued vaccination, in the hope of 
obtaining the status of "FMD free without vaccination," a goal it achieved 
in 1996. Also hoping to achieve the coveted "FMD free without vaccina-
tion" status, Argentina and Paraguay stopped vaccinating in 1999, as did 
portions of Brazil in 2000. However, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Colom-
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bia, Venezuela and parts of Brazil continued to report FMD outbreaks 
through the 1990s and continued to vaccinate. 
As a result of discontinuing vaccination, Uruguay, Argentina, Para-
guay and parts of Brazil were at great risk for FMD. Their increased 
susceptibility was due to the progressive loss of immunity in large cattle 
populations over a short period of time, the continual danger of the 
spread of FMD from the remaining endemic areas, and the movement 
of large numbers of now-susceptible young livestock to fattening areas. 
Because they were free ofFMD, these countries devoted fewer people 
and resources to the eradication project. Some people believe that the 
decreased resources contributed to the failure of surveillance and commu-
nication systems between countries. Education and training of public and 
private individuals also decreased, and political and commercial interests 
became more important than sanitary requirements. In a few years, the 
entire veterinary infrastructure promoted by PHEFA was weakened, and 
FMD invaded the southern region of South America, including Uruguay. 
The re-introduction of FMD into the region 
In 2000, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay reported outbreaks of foot 
and mouth disease with both the type 0 and the type A viruses. FMD 
types A and type 0 were reported in Argentina, where 124 premises were 
eventually involved. Twenty-two facilities were affected in Brazil, with 
12 confirmed as type 0, and three farms were infected in an adjacent part 
of Uruguay. All three countries conducted depopulation ('stamping-out') 
campaigns and, by the end of 2000, believed the viruses to be eradicated. 
However, in February 2001, Argentina reported the first cases of a mas-
sive FMD outbreak that would eventually affect all three countries. This 
virus, a type A, spread rapidly and explosively through the central and 
eastern part of Argentina, although a special control region prevented the 
epidemic from extending into the south. Despite extensive depopulation 
efforts, the disease had affected over 2,000 premises by the end of 2001 
and was still out of control in Argentina. Brazil reported its first out-
break with this virus in May 2001, in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. The 
affected herd and contact animals were immediately culled, and a vac-
cination campaign was initiated that prevented the virus from spreading 
outside this state. Ultimately, Brazil would report 37 outbreaks ofFMD 
in Rio Grande do Sul in 2001. 
On April23, 2001, FMD type A appeared in Uruguay, from Argenti-
na. The first infected farm was reported in Palmitas, Soriano Department 
(state). Palmitas is approximately 70 km from Uruguay's border with 
Argentina, the Uruguay River. Thirty-nine of the 430 cattle on the 
affected farm had signs ofFMD. Lesions were not seen on the farm's 
640 sheep. The affected and exposed animals were killed the following 
day. On April 26, FMD was found on a neighboring farm, which had a 
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mixed population of cattle, sheep and pigs. At the same time, several FMD 
outbreaks occurred in the adjacent Colonia Department, 25 km from the 
Uruguay River and 40 km from the first cases. The zone where the out-
break first occurred is economically integrated with the adjacent region 
of Argentina, which was experiencing FMD outbreaks, and the virus is 
assumed to have spread from this region via fomites or people. 
Quarantines were immediately placed on both affected departments 
and, the following day, the remaining affected and exposed animals were 
destroyed and buried. In total, 5,093 cattle, 1,511 sheep, and 333 pigs 
were culled. Three days later, the government was forced to suspend the 
stamping-out procedure because of strong resistance by local farmers and 
the discovery that the disease had spread to other areas of the country. 
Authorities learned that, a few days before the first cases were recognized, 
cattle had been sold at auction and delivered to other parts ofUruguay. 
The movement of people, agricultural equipment and machinery, and milk 
and beef trucks are also thought to have contributed to the spread of the 
virus. On April26, Uruguay began ring vaccination of cattle within a 10 
km radius of the affected farms. Beginning on April27, all movement 
and trade of animals were prohibited throughout the country. On April 30, 
vaccination was extended to form a protective barrier to prevent the virus 
from entering uninfected states or neighboring countries. 
The vaccination program 
On May 5, Uruguayan authorities initiated a massive vaccination 
program for all cattle. The Uruguayan veterinary services established a 
vaccination timetable, scheduling routes, dates, and times. The vaccine 
was provided to farmers free of charge, and the farmers were responsible 
for vaccinating their animals within a given time period. Animals in areas 
adjacent to the state of Rio Grande do Sul were vaccinated first in order to 
protect Brazilian livestock. Vaccination proceeded from north to south and 
from east to west, and was completed on June 7; movement and transit 
restrictions were then relaxed. In total, nearly 11 million cattle were vac-
cinated. Government-administered serological tests at the completion of 
the vaccination program suggested that compliance had been 99 percent. 
Uruguay's 12 million sheep, which share pastures with the cattle, were not 
vaccinated; however, this did not seem to hamper the eradication of the 
virus. The approximately 270,000 pigs were also left unvaccinated, as the 
vaccine used was not thought to be effective in this species. At the height 
of the epidemic, 40-60 new infected farms were being found each day; 
however, by the end of the first round of vaccination, there were fewer 
than 10 new foci per day. 
From June 15 to July 22, Uruguay conducted a re-vaccination program. 
A total of24 million doses ofFMD oil-adjuvanted vaccines were distributed 
during these two vaccination rounds. In November 2001, an additional4.5 
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million young cattle that had ~een born since 2000 were vaccinated or 
re-vaccinated, and each animal was identified by an ear-tag tracking sys-
tem. This revaccination effort boosted immunity in the cattle population to 
the optimum levels, and decreased the risk that vaccinated animals might 
become carriers. A few days after the completion of the second round of 
vaccination, only a few sporadic cases were being found. The last case of 
FMD was found on a dairy farm on August 21. By October, Uruguay was 
again classified as "free ofFMD, with vaccination." Re-vaccination of all 
cattle was carried out again in February 2002 and May 2002. 
There have been some concerns about the use of vaccines in 
eradication efforts. Some FMD outbreaks in the past were linked to 
incompletely inactivated, older vaccines. Although newer vaccines use 
better inactivation methods, there are still fears that this could occur. It 
may also be possible for animals to become FMD carriers, even when 
vaccinated. In this South American epidemic, there were no documented 
cases of vaccinated animals causing new outbreaks. 
The cost of the outbreak 
From April 23 to August 21, 2001, a total of 2,057 farms or facilities 
in Uruguay were affected by FMD, a number similar to the farms affect-
ed by the epidemic in the U.K. However, Uruguay was able to eradicate 
its extensive outbreak solely by restrictions on livestock movement and 
the vaccination of cattle, in spite of having a large and fully susceptible 
sheep population in close contact with the cattle. The total direct cost of 
eradication was estimated at $13.6 million. Vaccine purchases accounted 
for $7.5 million, with the remainder used for compensation payments to 
farmers, cleaning and disinfection, and operating expenses. The $13.6 
million does not include some expenses incurred by the Army, which 
collaborated by controlling illegal livestock movements in border areas 
and providing other support. Argentina and Brazil also managed to con-
trol their epidemics, in part by vaccination. 
The loss of export markets and a pronounced decrease in livestock 
prices associated with the epidemic were costly for Uruguay. The esti-
mated losses as a result of the closing of external markets to Uruguayan 
farmers exceeded $200 million. Financial losses to meat and dairy pro-
ducers, in particular, had a significant negative impact on the national 
economy. In addition, movement restrictions on the entire livestock 
sector affected many workers and associated industries such as pack-
ing plants. Losses associated with closed packing plants, as well as 
the return of 380 containers of meat that were in transatlantic transit at 
the time ofthe outbreak, added approximately $30 million in costs. In 
total, the epidemic cost Uruguay approximately $243.6 million, a much 
smaller figure than the approximately $10 billion in losses to agriculture, 
the food chain and tourism during the outbreak in the U.K. In addition, 
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approximately 6,900 animals were culled in Uruguay compared with the 
more than 6 million animals killed in the U.K. 
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Monkeypox in the United States, 2003 
Veterinarians work to prevent, diagnose and treat disease in a wide 
variety of species, but they also take on the role of gatekeeper to decrease 
the incidence of disease transmission between humans and animals. Vet-
erinarians need to have a knowledge of zoonotic diseases, and should 
question animal owners about illness if a zoonosis is suspected in animals 
or people. The 2003 monkeypox outbreak demonstrates the importance of 
close cooperation between the medical, public health, and veterinary com-
munities in addressing zoonotic diseases. 
On June 7, 2003, public health officials from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) and the states of Wisconsin, Illinois, and 
Indiana reported the first outbreak of human monkeypox in the Western 
Hemisphere. Monkeypox is a rare, zoonotic viral disease that occurs 
primarily in the rain forest countries of Central and West Africa. The 
monkeypox virus is a member of the orthopox family of viruses. Other 
orthopoxviruses that can infect humans include variola (smallpox), vac-
cinia (the attenuated virus used in the smallpox vaccine), cowpox virus, 
buffalopox virus, and the newly described Cantagalo virus in Brazil. In 
humans, infection with the monkeypox virus results in a rash illness 
similar to, but less infectious than, smallpox. The incubation period 
is approximately 12 days. Monkeypox in humans is not usually fatal; 
depending on the outbreak, deaths typically occur in 1-10% of all cases. 
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Animal species known to be susceptible to monkeypox include non-
human primates, rabbits, and some rodents. 
How did monkeypox get to the United States? 
Traceback investigations found that the source of the infection was 
a shipment of animals from Ghana imported into Texas on April 9. The 
shipment contained approximately 800 small mammals of nine different 
species, including six African rodents. The rodents included rope squir-
rels, tree squirrels, Gambian giant rats, brush-tailed porcupines, dormice, 
and striped mice. Some of these animals had reportedly become ill and 
died suddenly, soon after their arrival in the U.S. The CDC tested some 
of the surviving animals by PCR and virus isolation, and found that one 
Gambian giant rat, three dormice, and two rope squirrels were infected 
with the monkeypox virus. 
Before the outbreak was detected, the monkeypox virus had spread 
into several states in these animals and in prairie dogs. Some of the 
imported animals were shipped from Texas to an Iowa distributor 
and then to a distributor in Illinois. In Illinois, the Gambian rats and 
dormice were kept in close proximity to prairie dogs, which became 
infected. The prairie dogs were then sold to other dealers and individu-
als in several states, including a Milwaukee animal distributor 
who purchased prairie dogs and a Gambian giant rat that was 
ill at the time. In May, some of these prairie dogs were sold to 
two pet shops in the Milwaukee area. Others were sold or traded 
during a pet "swap meet" (pets for sale or exchange) in northern 
Wisconsin. All of the exposed prairie dogs could not be traced 
during the investigation. 
The first human case of monkeypox occurred in a child who 
had been bitten by an infected pet prairie dog. The child's mother 
and father also became infected through contact with this animal. 
Scientists at the Marshfield Clinic in Marshfield, Wisconsin recov-
ered the first viral isolates from one of the patients and a prairie 
dog. Using electron microscopy, they found a poxvirus in the skin 
of the human patient and the lymph node of the prairie dog. The 
CDC conducted further laboratory testing including PCR, serol-
ogy, immunohistochemistry, and gene sequencing that confirmed 
these results and demonstrated that the poxvirus was the monkey-
pox virus. The CDC advised physicians, veterinarians, and the 
public to report instances of rash illness associated with exposure 
to prairie dogs, Gambian rats, or other animals to local and state 
public health authorities. In total, 37 laboratory-confirmed and 35 
suspected human cases were reported in Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Missouri, Wisconsin and Ohio. In most patients, the disease took 
the form of fever and vesicular skin eruptions. Two patients, both 
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children, had serious illnesses including one case of encephalitis. However, 
this outbreak was unusual in that no human deaths were reported. Distinct 
monkeypox isolates are found in West Africa and the Congo basin, with 
the Congo strains more virulent for primates. The strain that entered the 
U.S. was a West African virus, a factor that seems to account for the mild-
ness of the outbreak. 
All of the human patients reported direct or close contact with sick 
prairie dogs. Cases of monkeypox were also reported in animals. In prairie 
dogs, the illness included fever, cough, conjunctivitis, and lymphade-
nopathy, followed by a nodular rash. Some prairie dogs died and others 
apparently recovered. Preliminary information suggests that the Gambian 
giant rat under investigation experienced a much milder illness with no 
respiratory signs and possibly limited dermatologic involvement. Veteri-
narians who suspected monkeypox in an animal were asked to contact 
the state health department for information on specimen submission, and 
not to perform necropsies or biopsies because of the risk of infection. 
The CDC recommended that all animals with suspected monkeypox be 
humanely euthanized to prevent further spread of the disease and the car-
cass be incinerated. If the animal was associated with a human case, it was 
to be tested to confirm the disease. In addition, the CDC recommended 
that all rodents from the April 9 shipment, and any prairie dogs on the 
premises at the same time as these African rodents, be euthanized. Other 
mammals that had been in contact with these animals were placed under 
quarantine for 6 weeks. 
On June 25, 2003, the CDC issued updated interim guidelines on 
the use of the smallpox vaccine, the antiviral drug cidofovir and vaccine 
immune globulin. The CDC recommended that people who had close or 
intimate contact with a confirmed case be vaccinated with the smallpox 
vaccine. These people could be vaccinated up to 14 days after exposure. 
Seven people including three veterinarians, two laboratory workers, and 
two health-care workers received pre-exposure prophylaxis. Another 
23 people were vaccinated after exposure. The CDC also issued recom-
mendations to medical workers on preventing transmission. Limited 
person-to-person transmission has been reported in monkeypox outbreaks 
in Africa, and health care personnel attending hospitalized patients were 
advised to follow standard precautions for guarding against airborne or 
contact illness. No cases of human-to-human transmission were con-
firmed in the outbreak in the U.S. Veterinarians examining or treating sick 
rodents, rabbits, and exotic pets like prairie dogs and Gambian rats were 
advised to use personal protective equipment such as gloves, surgical 
masks or N-95 respirators, and gowns. 
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Monkeypox: Report of Cases in the United States 
Data reported to CDC as of July 30, 2003. This is the .final report. 
S tate Cases Under Lab-Confirmed 
In vestigation Cases 
Illinois 13 9 
Indiana 16 7 
Kansas 1 1 
Missouri 2 2 
Ohio 1 0 
Wisconsin 39 18 
Total 72 37 
On June 11, 2003, the CDC and the FDA issued a joint order 
announcing an immediate embargo on the importation of all rodents 
from Africa, due to the potential for these rodents to spread the monkey-
pox virus to other animal species and to humans. The joint order also 
banned within the U.S. any sale, offering for distribution, transport, or 
release into the environment, of prairie dogs and six genera of African 
rodents implicated in the monkeypox outbreak. On November 3, 2003, 
the joint order was replaced by an interim final rule in which the CDC 
restricts importation of these animals and the FDA restricts domestic 
interstate and intrastate movement, with exemption procedures to accom-
modate special circumstances. The last human case of monkeypox in the 
U.S. was acquired on June 20, 2003. 
Sources of Information 
Chen N, Li G, Liszewski MK, Atkinson JP, Jahrling PB, Feng Z, Schriewer J, Buck C, Wang C, 
Lefkowitz EJ, Esposito 11, Harms T, Damon IK, Roper RL, Upton C, Buller RM. Virulence 
differences between monkeypox virus isolates from West Africa and the Congo basin. 
Virology. 2005;340( I ):46-63. 
Guamer 1, Johnson BJ , Paddock CD, Shieh W-J, Goldsmith CS, Reynolds MG, et al. Monkeypox 
transmission and pathogenesis in prairie dogs. Emerg Infect Dis. 2004 Mar;l0(3):426-31. 
Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/voll Ono3/03-0878.htm. Accessed 20 Sept 2005. 
Update: Multistate outbreak ofmonkeypox - Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin, 2003. Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2003 June 13 ; 52(23):537-40. 
Update: Multistate outbreak ofmonkeypox- Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin, 2003. Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2003 June 20;52(24):561-4.Update: Multistate 
outbreak ofmonkeypox- Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri , Ohio, and Wisconsin, 2003. 
Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2003July 11;52(27):642-646. 
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention( CDC). Monkeypox infections in animals: 
Updated interim guidance for veterinarians. July 31, 2003. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/ 
ncidod/monkeypox/animalguidance.htrn. Accessed 2003. 
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention( CDC). Monkeypox report of cases in the United States. 
July 30, 2003. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/mpv/cases.htrn. Accessed 2003. 
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention( CDC). Monkeypox report of cases in the United 
States Final count, as of July 30, 2003 . Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/mpv/ 
cases.htrn. Accessed 2 Oct 2005. 
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U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention( CDC). Public health investigation uncovers first 
outbreak of human monkeypox infection in Western Hemisphere. CDC Press Release. June 7, 
2003. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressreVr030607.htm. Accessed 2003. 
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC). Questions and answers about monkeypox. 
November 4, 2003. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/monkeypox/qa.htm. Accessed 2003. 
Nipah Virus in Malaysia, 1999-2000, and Bangladesh, 2001-2004 
The Nipah virus is an example of an emerging viral pathogen. This 
virus is a previously unknown member of the family Paramyxoviridae 
that has been identified primarily in humans, pigs, and fruit bats. It 
was first recognized during an outbreak of respiratory and neurologic 
disease in pigs. More than 200 people who had contact with infected 
pigs developed encephalitis, which was often fatal. The virus later 
reappeared briefly in Malaysia, and several times in Bangladesh. Two 
elements that can be significant in the emergence of a viral epidemic 
or epizootic are the agents pathogenicity to the host and its capacity 
to establish itself in new hosts. The Nipah virus, which appears to exist 
naturally in fruit bats, became established in pigs in Malaysia and was 
lethal to humans. Enormous numbers of pigs contracted the disease, 
which became so widespread that for public health protection, half 
of Malaysia s commercial pig population had to be destroyed. In Ban-
gladesh, where pigs are uncommon, clusters of encephalitis were seen 
periodically in humans between 2001 and 2004, but these outbreaks 
were self-limiting and unrelated to exposure to livestock. 
From late 1998 through the first half of 1999, a new pig disease char-
acterized by pronounced respiratory and neurologic signs, sometimes 
with sudden death in sows and boars, began to spread among pig farms 
in Malaysia. It was not initially identified as a new syndrome because 
the morbidity and mortality rates were not high and the symptoms were 
not markedly different from other known diseases including Japanese 
encephalitis, a mosquito-borne disease prevalent in most countries in Asia. 
But when measures to control Japanese encephalitis did not prevent an 
increased incidence of viral encephalitis in pig farm workers, attention 
was again focused on the mysterious pig disease. In March 1999, Malay-
sian researchers isolated an unknown virus, which was identified by the 
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as a previously 
unknown paramyxovirus. The virus was termed the Nipah virus and the 
syndrome in pigs became known as the Porcine Respiratory and Encepha-
litis Syndrome, Porcine Respiratory and Neurologic Syndrome, or simply 
Barking Pig Syndrome after the loud cough seen in infected pigs. 
By the time the virus was identified, pigs on many farms in penin-
sular Malaysia were already showing signs of the disease. Transmission 
between farms was attributed to the movement of pigs, as well as the 
sharing of boar semen and possibly the movement of dogs and cats. The 
Nipah virus spread rapidly among pigs on the. infected farms, probably by 
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direct contact with infected pigs' excretions and secretions such as urine, 
saliva, or pharyngeal and bronchial secretions. Pigs in Malaysia are 
typically kept in close confinement, which can encourage the spread of 
pathogens between animals. 
What is the Nipah virus? 
The Nipah virus is a previously unrecognized paramyxovirus that 
appears to be related to another emerging virus, the Hendra virus in 
Australia. The Nipah virus can infect pigs, humans, dogs, and goats. 
Antibodies to the virus have also been reported in cats and horses, and 
viral antigens were found in one case of meningitis in a horse. Sheep 
may also be affected. In pigs, the Nipah virus causes rapid and labored 
breathing, an explosive and non-productive cough, neurologic changes 
including lethargy or aggressive behavior, and sudden death. The Nipah 
virus spreads readily from infected swine to other species. In pigs, the 
virus is found in high concentrations in the epithelial cells of the airways, 
facilitating its airborne spread. 
In Malaysia, most human cases seemed to occur after close direct 
contact with the excretions or secretions from an infected pig. No cases 
of human-to-human transmission were documented during this epi-
demic; however, researchers suspect that person-to-person transmission 
occurred during more recent outbreaks in Bangladesh. In humans, the 
Nipah virus localizes in the brain after it circulates in the blood. The 
most common signs of infection are fever, severe headache, myalgia, 
encephalitis, or meningitis. Approximately half of all human cases seen 
to date have been fatal. 
Where did the virus come from? 
Fruit bats (flying foxes) are thought to be the natural hosts for 
the Nipah virus. Environmental circumstances could have led to the 
emergence of the virus from this species into pigs. There is greater 
contact between humans and their domestic animals and bats as inten-
sive farming practices encroach into previously undisturbed natural 
habitats. The concentration of pigs and fruit trees on the same farms 
can lead to increased contact between fruit bats and pigs. Biologists 
have also noted that flying foxes are increasingly seen in urban areas. 
When a virus exists in a ubiquitous wild animal reservoir, such as 
bats, its emergence into humans and domestic animals can be difficult 
to prevent. Recently, researchers have found that at least two major 
strains of the Nipah virus circulated in pigs during the 1998 epidemic. 
A strain isolated from the initial outbreak in the northern regions dif-
fers significantly from a strain isolated four months later in the south. 
These results suggest that the Nipah epidemic in Malaysia was not due 
to a single transmission of the virus from fruit bats into pigs. Instead, 
The Nipah 
virus, which 
appears to exis 
naturally in fr 
bats, became 
established in 
pigs and was 
lethal to huma 
Emerging & Exotic Diseases of Animals 
it now seems that the virus may have emerged at least twice over the 
course of this outbreak. 
Advances in microbiological techniques can also contribute to the 
recognition of emerging diseases. The discovery of the Nipah virus was 
facilitated by increased technical abilities, as well as by the discovery of 
a related virus, the Hendra virus, in Australia in 1994. Like the Nipah 
virus, the Hendra virus appears to be found in fruit bats in nature and was 
only discovered when it emerged into other species and caused disease. 
Control measures 
The Nipah virus is a biosafety level 4 agent because it causes death in 
people and there is no treatment or vaccine. At the time of the outbreak, 
there were no biosafety level 4 laboratories in Malaysia. Researchers 
from both the U.S. CDC and the Australian Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO) helped the Malaysian govern-
ment to isolate the virus, develop diagnostic tests, conduct transmission 
studies, and implement an eradication program. 
The primary measure used to control the Nipah virus outbreak was the 
culling of pigs. Between the end of February and the end of April 1999, 
over 900,000 pigs from almost 900 farms were destroyed. The depopula-
tion of infected pigs successfully controlled the human epidemic. The 
culling program was stopped after all known and suspected infected herds 
were destroyed. An ELISA test was developed to identify infected farms 
and a national swine testing and surveillance program was begun at the 
end of Aprill999. The program required that each farm be sampled twice, 
with a minimum interval of three weeks between sampling. In the follow-
ing three months, 889 farms were tested and 50 farms were found to be 
positive. The positive farms were considered infected and 172,750 pigs 
were destroyed. The government then developed a control program to 
provide continued monitoring of all pigs prior to slaughter. An educational 
program for farmers was also implemented. 
Before the outbreak, pigs were second only to poultry in the Malay-
sian livestock industry. The Nipah outbreak resulted in the reduction of 
the Malaysian swine population from 2.4 million to 1.32 million pigs. The 
total number of farms decreased from 1,885 to 829. The outbreak also 
caused dramatic changes in the pig farming industry. In one state, Negeri 
Sembilan, pig farming is completely prohibited. In other areas, pig farming 
is now only allowed in an identified Pig Farming Area. The restocking of 
farms that had been depopulated is subject to government approval. After 
the outbreak, farmers were encouraged to undertake other agriculture and 
livestock activities. 
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Continued threats from the virus 
in Malaysia, Bangladesh and other countries 
The presence of the Nipah virus in native wildlife populations poses 
a continuing threat to the pig and human populations in Malaysia. The 
Nipah virus may have reemerged in June and July 2000 when neutraliz-
ing antibodies were found in pigs on some farms in Peninsular Malaysia. 
A total of 1,700 pigs were destroyed in two farms in the state ofPerak. In 
July 2000, IgG antibodies to the Nipah virus were also found in pigs on 
some farms in Sarawak. Four pig workers in Sarawak also had antibodies. 
Approximately 6,000 pigs were destroyed to control this outbreak. 
More recently, a series ofNipah virus outbreaks unrelated to pigs 
have been reported in Bangladesh. In April and May 2001, several 
people in Chandpur village, Meherpur District developed an unknown 
neurologic disease with fever. The first case occurred in a 33 year old 
farmer who became ill on April20 and died 6 days later. The farmer's 
wife, son, brother, and sister also developed the disease. In total, 13 cases 
and 9 deaths occurred in eight households. Japanese encephalitis, dengue 
fever, and malaria were ruled out. No samples were taken from the nine 
patients who died, but a later investigation revealed Nipah virus antibod-
ies in the four surviving patients. From January 11 to 28, 2003, a cluster 
of similar cases appeared in villages in Naogaon District, approximately 
150 km from the first outbreak. Twelve people in eight households were 
affected. Eight patients died, usually within a few days of the disease 
onset; no diagnostic samples were available from these cases. The four 
survivors of this outbreak also had Nipah virus antibodies. 
No obvious zoonotic source was found in either of these two out-
breaks. No clusters of illness were seen in pigs, which are uncommon 
in Bangladesh, or in any other species. Serum samples collected from 2 
pigs and 31 bats in Meherpur were all negative for Nipah virus antibod-
ies. In Naogaon, 50 animals including 10 birds, 4 pigs, 4 dogs, 2 shrews, 
5 rodents, and 25 bats were tested by serology. Antibodies to the Nipah 
virus were found only in two flying foxes. Although case control studies 
did suggest that patients were more likely than controls to have been in 
contact with a sick cow, no cows were available for testing and this asso-
ciation may be due to chance. It also appears that the virus might have 
been spread, in part, by person-to-person transmission. There were sev-
eral clusters of cases within households, with family members becoming 
ill over a short period. In addition, people in Meherpur were more likely 
to be infected if they lived with or cared for patients, particularly if they 
had contact with secretions such as saliva or urine. 
From January through April 2004, two new clusters of fatal encepha-
litis were seen in Bangladesh. The first occurred in Manikganj, Rajbari 
Jaipurhat, Naogaon and Faridpur provinces from early January through 
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February. As of February 26, 22 cases and 17 deaths were attributed to the 
Nipah virus, with an additional 51 cases still under investigation. Another 
cluster of cases was reported in April in Faridpur district. As of April 20, 30 
cases and 18 deaths had been seen. In both outbreaks, CDC laboratories con-
firmed that the Nipah virus was the cause of disease in a number of the cases. 
Health officials continue to be on the lookout for the Nipah virus or 
similar viruses, which could re-emerge in Bangladesh, Malaysia, or other 
countries. Although henipavirus (Nipah and Hendra) outbreaks have been 
reported only in Australia, Malaysia, and Bangladesh, their actual range 
could be considerably broader. Flying foxes, the natural hosts for these 
viruses, can be found from the east coast of Africa across south and South-
east Asia, east to the Philippines and Pacific islands, and south to Australia. 
Recently, the Nipah virus was isolated from Lyle's bats in Cambodia. 
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2004 Dec; I 0:2082-7. 
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(APHIS), Center for Emerging Issues. Available at: http:// www.aphis.usda.gov:80/vs/ceah/cei/ 
nipahupd.htm. *Accessed 2003. 
World Health Organization (WHO). Nipah-like virus in Bangladesh. 12 February 2004. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_ 02 _ 12/en/index.html. Accessed 14 Sept 2005. 
World Health Organization (WHO). Nipah-like virus in Bangladesh - update 26 February 2004. 
Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_02_26/en/index.html. Accessed 14 Sept 2005. 
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Originally reviewed by: 
Jasbir Singh, Department of Veterinary Sciences, Malaysian government and former ISU 
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*defimct link as of 2005 
Screwworm-New World 
(Cochliomyia hominivorax) in the United States, 2000 
This is an example of how prompt actions taken by veterinary prac-
titioners prevented the introduction and spread of screwworm myiasis, a 
devastating disease. Screwworms were once endemic throughout the 
southern United States, but were eradicated by a program that involved 
the release of sterile male flies. The New World screwworm still exists in 
parts of the Caribbean and South America and could be re-introduced to 
the US. at any time. 
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On February 27, 2000, a shipment of 17 horses from Argentina 
arrived at a quarantine facility in Miami, Florida. Two days later, 16 
of the 17 horses were released from quarantine. On March 1, the one 
remaining horse, a four-year-old chestnut thoroughbred gelding, was 
also released. The next day, a private practitioner performed a physical 
examination on this horse and found minor discharge from the prepuce, 
no swelling, and a bad odor-and, on closer examination, a number of 
insect larvae in the penis. The practitioner collected 50-100 larvae from 
the distal penis of the horse and contacted federal authorities. On March 
3, a USDA APHIS foreign animal disease diagnostician (FADD) submit-
ted samples of larvae from the horse to the USDA National Veterinary 
Services Laboratories (NVSL) in Ames, Iowa, and appropriately treated 
the horse and premises. On March 4, the NVSL confirmed that the 
samples from the horse were screwworm larvae in the third instar stage. 
The horse received a second treatment on March 6 and remained in 
quarantine until its wound was completely healed. It was released from 
quarantine on March 15, after being examined by a federal veterinarian. 
The other 16 horses in the February 27 shipment were traced and each 
horse was examined twice by a FADD, at three to five day intervals. No 
evidence of disease was found in any of these horses. APHIS Veterinary 
Services began intensive screwworm surveillance in Florida and senti-
nel animals were placed in the West Palm Beach area from March 10 to 
Apri I 1 7. Screwworms were not found. 
Another screwworm incident occurred in December 2000 in Dade 
County, Florida, in a pet cat that had traveled with a U.S. military 
employee from the Guantanamo Bay military base in Cuba to the U.S. 
In Cuba, a veterinarian had treated an abscess on the foot of the cat with 
ivermectin for five consecutive days before departure. Throughout the 
treatment, the veterinarian removed several dead larvae from the wound, 
which was healing over. When the owner arrived in Florida, he took the 
cat to a private practitioner, who removed one larva from the partially 
healed abscess. The practitioner shipped the larva to the NVSL where the 
diagnostician identified a mature Cochliomyia hominivorax larva in the 
third instar stage. The cat was treated and the disease did not spread. 
What are screwworms? 
Screwworm myiasis is a devastating parasitic disease that has long 
been a leading cause of livestock losses in tropical areas of the Western 
Hemisphere. The larvae of the New World screwworm fly, Cochlio-
myia hominivorax, feed on the open wounds of warm-blooded animals, 
including humans. Unlike ordinary maggots that subsist on debris and 
dead tissue, screwworm larvae attack living flesh, causing debilitation 
and sometimes even death. Wounds prone to screwworm infestation 
include those caused by feeding ticks, the bites of vampire bats, castra-
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tion, dehorning, branding, shearing, wire cuts, sore mouth in sheep, and 
shedding of the velvet in deer. The navels of newborn mammals are also 
common sites of infestation. 
New World screwworms were once found throughout the tropical 
and subtropical regions of North, Central, and South America, but have 
been eradicated from many countries by a series of cooperative programs 
involving the release of sterile male flies. This approach, conducted and 
sustained by the USDA APHIS, has systematically eliminated screw-
worms from the U.S., Mexico and most of Central America over the last 
five decades . In late 1998, the USDA and Panama began the final phase 
of the Screwworm Eradication Program in that southernmost Central 
American country. Because there is no screwworm control plan for South 
America, sterile fly releases across eastern Panama will continue to be 
necessary even after Panama becomes screwworm-free. The sterile flies 
will create and maintain a biological barrier in Panama's Darien Gap, halt-
ing the pest's northward migration at the Panama-Colombia border. In 
addition to South America, screwworm is endemic on a few islands in the 
Caribbean, including Hispanola, Cuba and Jamaica. 
Sources of Information 
Emergency reports submitted to the OlE by the USDA in 2000. Accessed 2003 . 
Personal communication, Dr. James Mertins, USDA, APHIS, NVSL, Ames, Iowa 500 I 0 
Thomas TM. (US Army Veterinary Corps). Screwworm containment in Panama during final military 
withdrawal. Available at: http://www.aphis. usda.gov:80/vs/training/ss _2000/pdf/pan-can-
shutdown.pdf. Accessed 2003. 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS). Factsheet: Screwworm. Available at: http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/fsheet_faq_ 
notice/fs ahscrewworm.html. Accessed 2003 . 
World Organization for Animal Health (Ol E). Available at: http ://www.oie.int. Accessed 2003. 
Reviewed by: 
Dr. James Mertins, USDA, APHIS, NVSL, Ames, Iowa 500 I 0 
*defun ct link as of 2004 
West Nile Virus in the United States, 1999-2005 
The outbreak of West Nile fever in New York in 1999 illustrates how a 
mosquito-borne disease that affects both humans and animals can spread. 
The West Nile virus had never before been reported in this hemisphere. The 
outbreak provides lessons about detecting and responding to a new dis-
ease, including the importance of local disease surveillance and response 
systems, communication among public health agencies, and links between 
public and animal health agencies. Veterinarians played an important role 
in the initial diagnosis of this outbreak. West Nile is now considered an 
endemic disease in the U.S. 
In early August 1999, Tracy McNamara, DVM, head ofthe depart-
ment of pathology at the Bronx Zoo, became concerned when she heard 
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that a large number of crows had been dying around the zoo. By late 
August, 40 crows had died. Then birds at the zoo began to die. Over the 
Labor Day weekend, the zoo lost a Guanay Cormorant, three Chilean 
flamingos, a pheasant, and a bald eagle. Because these deaths followed 
thos~ of the crows, experts strongly doubted that the disease originated 
in the zoo. Necropsies of the birds revealed streaking in the heart and 
brain hemorrhages. Eastern equine encephalitis was suspected but 
McNamara was skeptical because the emus in her care, which are very 
susceptible to eastern equine encephalitis virus, were thriving. "It was 
becoming more and more suggestive that this was not a regular bird dis-
ease," McNamara said. When two more flamingos died on September 
9, she sent samples to the USDA's National Veterinary Services Labora-
tories (NVSL) in Ames, Iowa. The NVSL ruled out avian influenza and 
Newcastle disease viruses. The Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) was also sent samples, as were doctors at an Army laboratory 
in Fort Detrick, Maryland. 
Meanwhile, on August 23, 1999, an infectious disease physician 
from a hospital in northern Queens contacted the New York City Depart-
ment of Health (NYCDOH) to report two patients with encephalitis. On 
investigation, NYCDOH initially identified a cluster of six patients with 
encephalitis, five of whom had profound muscle weakness. Testing of 
these initial cases was positive for St. Louis encephalitis virus on Sep-
tember 3 at the CDC. Eight of the earliest case-patients were residents 
of a 2 x 2-mile area in northern Queens. On the basis of these findings, 
aerial and ground applications of mosquito adulticides and larvacides 
were instituted in northern Queens and South Bronx on September 3. 
What happened next? 
In Ames, Iowa, the NVSL isolated a virus from the birds' tissues 
and, after ruling out several viral agents that cause encephalitis in 
birds, performed an electron microscopy examination. Forty nanometer 
virus particles ,with the morphology of togaviruses or flaviviruses were 
observed. On September 20, the NVSL forwarded the virus cultures 
to the CDC for identification and characterization. Testing at the CDC 
on September 23 indicated that the isolate was closely related to the 
West Nile virus (WNV), which had never been isolated in the western 
hemisphere. CDC experts also detected flavivirus antigens in one of the 
human autopsy specimens by immunohistochemistry and found a West 
Nile-like virus genomic sequence in a human brain specimen from an 
encephalitis case; this sequence was identical to that derived from the 
bird tissues. Concurrently, specimens of brain tissue from three human 
encephalitis cases, forwarded by the New York State Department of 
Health to the University of California, Irvine, were reported as positive 
for the West Nile-like virus sequence by genomic analysis. 
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By September 28, a total of 17 confirmed and 20 probable human cases 
and four deaths had been reported in New York City and the surrounding 
counties. The four deaths occurred among persons over 68 years of age. 
The onset dates ranged from August 5 to September 16. The median age of 
the patients was 71 years (range 15-87 years), with the most severe clini-
cal cases and all fatalities occurring among older persons. In October 1999, 
the NVSL first isolated the West Nile virus from the brain tissue of a Long 
Island horse that had clinical encephalitis. WNV was also isolated at NVSL 
from two additional encephalitic horses in 1999 and WNV antibodies were 
identified in ill horses in Suffolk and Essex counties, New York. Retro-
spective classification of likely West Nile cases occurring prior to October 
resulted in a total of 25 equine cases. 
What is the West Nile virus? 
The West Nile virus is a flavivirus belonging taxonomically to the 
Japanese encephalitis subgroup. This subgroup also includes the St. Louis 
encephalitis virus, Kunjin virus, Murray Valley encephalitis virus, and 
others. The West Nile virus was first isolated in the West Nile province of 
Uganda in 1937. It is a mosquito-transmitted virus that, in endemic regions, 
cycles between birds and mosquitoes. Many infected birds are asymptom-
atic, but high mortality rates have been seen in some species-particularly 
crows, ravens, and jays. When environmental conditions favor high viral 
amplification, mosquitoes can also spread the virus to mammals. In the 
northern United States, the West Nile virus has been most closely associ-
ated with Culex pipiens, a mosquito species that breeds in standing water, 
especially water polluted with organic matter. It has been thought that these 
mosquitoes "prefer" to bite birds, but if breeding sites are available near 
homes and domestic animal enclosures, Culex pipiens may bite people and 
domestic animals. Culex pipiens is most active at dawn and dusk. Another 
hypothesis suggests that other species of mosquitoes, not Culex pipiens, 
acts as a "bridge," biting both birds and mammals. Some recent evidence 
indicates that Culex salinarius is responsible for WNV transmission to peo-
ple. C. salinarius is found in fresh and saltwater marshes, lakes, ponds, and 
seepage areas, as well as in the many types of artificial containers found 
around human residences and businesses. This species is active from sunset 
to sunrise. Like the St. Louis encephalitis virus, the West Nile virus is not 
transmitted from person to person or from birds to people. 
Among mammals, symptomatic infections mainly seem to occur in 
humans and horses. In humans, many cases of West Nile fever are mild 
and flu-like; however, in more severe cases, there may be signs of enceph-
alitis, meningoencephalitis or meningitis. Horses develop symptoms of 
encephalitis, often without a fever. The first recorded epidemics of West 
Nile fever occurred in Israel during 1950-1954 and in 1957. The largest 
recorded epidemic occurred in South Africa in 1974. Epidemics were also 
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reported in Europe in the Rhone delta ofFrance in 1962 and in Romania 
in 1996. The West Nile virus had never been recognized in the United 
States or any other area of the Western Hemisphere prior to 1999. 
The response to the outbreak 
Vector control measures had been 
initiated in northern Queens and the 
South Bronx on September 3. These 
measures were followed by a citywide 
pesticide application, after a laboratory 
confirmed a case of West Nile encephali-
tis in a Brooklyn resident with no travel 
history to Queens and two additional 
cases in the South Bronx. Surveillance 
of wild birds and sentinel chickens was 
instituted to assess WNV distribution 
in the region. Emergency telephone 
hotlines were established in New York 
City on September 3 and in Westches-
ter County on September 21 to address 
public inquiries about the encephalitis outbreak and pesticide applica-
tion. Approximately 300,000 cans of DEBT-based mosquito repellant 
were distributed citywide through local firehouses, and 750,000 public 
health leaflets were distributed with information about personal protec-
tion against mosquito bites. Recurring public messages were announced 
on radio, television, web sites, and in newspapers, urging personal 
protection against mosquito bites. Recommended actions included 
limiting outdoor activity during the peak hours of mosquito activity, 
wearing long-sleeved shirts and long pants, using DEBT-based insect 
repellents, and eliminating any potential mosquito breeding niches. 
Spraying schedules were also publicized and people were advised 
to remain indoors during spraying to reduce pesticide exposure. 
By the end of 1999, the West Nile virus had been identified in a 
limited area of the northeastern United States in wild birds, mosquitoes, 
humans, and horses. Naturally occurring virus had been found in birds 
and mosquitoes in parts of Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and in 
one county in Maryland. Clinical illness in humans and horses occurred 
during a period from early August through late October and was limited 
to New York. WNV activity ended for the season because of various 
factors, including climate and vector control activities. In all, 62 human 
cases, with seven deaths, were recognized in 1999. Twenty-five cases of 
West Nile encephalitis were also identified in horses, all in Suffolk and 
Nassau Counties on Long Island, New York. Because horses are known 
not to play a role in the transmission ofWNV, quarantines were never 
Horses are highly sus< 
tible to the West Nile ~ 
Source: Clint May, ISU 
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placed on any non-clinically ill horses in the outbreak area. However, the 
movement of horses was restricted, particularly the export of horses from 
affected areas to the European Union and the shipment of any horses to 
the E.U. via Kennedy airport. 
In genetic sequencing studies, the West Nile virus isolates from the New 
York outbreak showed strong similarities to isolates from Israel, suggesting 
that this region may have been the origin of the virus. How the West Nile 
virus was introduced into the United States is unknown, but speculation has 
centered on infected humans, mosquitoes, or birds being transported by air-
craft. Several other speculated routes of entry also exist. 
The continuing spread of the West Nile virus 
In 2000, 21 human cases of West Nile encephalitis were reported. Two 
elderly patients, an 82-year-old man in New Jersey and an 87-year-old 
woman in New York, died of the disease. Sixty confirmed equine cases 
were confirmed in seven states; 37 horses survived and 23 (38%) died 
or were euthanized. Six wild mammals were classified as WNV-positive 
and 4,323 infected birds were documented in 12 states plus the District of 
Columbia. A total of 143 counties in 12 eastern states and the District of 
Columbia had confirmed findings ofWNV in a mosquito, bird, or mammal. 
In 2001, the virus spread through bird migration south to Florida, west 
to Iowa, and north to Canada. There were 66 human cases in 10 states, 
including nine deaths. As before, most of the cases occurred in older 
patients; the median age was 68 and the range was 9 to 90 years. A total of 
733 equine cases were reported from 127 counties in 19 states, a 12-fold 
increase from 2000. More than 7,000 WNV-positive wild birds were found 
in 328 counties in 27 states and the District of Columbia. In 66 percent of 
the counties, dead crows were the first indication of West Nile virus activ-
ity. Positive birds were collected from April to December 2001. West Nile 
virus did not affect any commercial poultry. 
From 2002 to 2005, the virus continued to spread across North and 
South America. By the end of the 2002 mosquito season, the West Nile 
virus was found throughout the Midwest and was spreading into the west-
em states. In 2003, this virus was first reported from some countries in 
South America. By 2005, it was found in all U.S. states except Alaska and 
Hawaii. The first West Nile virus vaccine for horses was licensed in 2002 
and a second vaccine was licensed in 2003. As a result, the number of 
West Nile virus cases in horses decreased from more than 15,000 in 2002, 
to approximately 1400 in 2004. Reported human infections also declined 
from over 9800 cases and 264 deaths in 2003, to approximately 2500 cases 
and 100 deaths in 2004. As of Sept 13, 1299 cases and 29 fatalities had 
been reported in 2005. The reasons for the declining case rate in humans 
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are unknown but may include weather patterns, mosquito control pro-
grams, public education, or other factors. 
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